

THE LUSHAI HILLS

BY ROBERT WOOD

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THE LUSHAI HILLS

CULLED FROM
HISTORY
OF THE
FRONTIER AREAS
BORDERING ON ASSAM

From 1883-1941

BY

SIR ROBERT REID

Governor of Assam, 1937-1942

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A Note

For facilities of scholars engaged in research on various aspects of Mizo and Lushai Culture and History, this rare book is reprinted by the Tribal Research Institute, Aizawl, with the help of grants received from the Department of Education, Government of Mizoram.

**Tribal Research Institute
Aizawl.**

Dr. (Mrs) N. Chatterjee
Senior Research Officer

THE LUSHAI HILLS

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INTRODUCTION

These notes, which have been compiled in my spare time as Governor of Assam, from 1937 to 1942 are an attempt to bring that invaluable work of reference, Sir Alexander Mackenzie's "History of the Relations of the Government with the Hill Tribes of the North-East Frontier of Bengal" up to date so far as it touches on the frontier districts of Assam, *i.e.*, taking them from south, by east, round to the north.

The Lushai Hills ;

Manipur State ;

The Naga Hills ;

Sadiya Frontier Tract ;

Balipara Frontier Tract.

Mackenzie's work was published by the Home Department Press, Calcutta in 1884 and his history of these areas stops short at that year or in some instances earlier.

The information contained in these notes has been almost entirely compiled from official sources except for occasional references to books such as Sir Henry Cotton's "Indian and Home Memories", Sir James Johnstone's "My Experiences in Manipur and the Naga Hills" or Mrs. Grimwood's "My three years in Manipur".

For the notes on Manipur, I am indebted for much good advice and information to Mr. J. C. Higgins, C.I.E., I.C.S., lately retired, who served for nearly 20 years in that State and to his successor Mr. C. Gimson, I.C.S., who has served for more than 10 years in the State.

For those on the Naga Hills, I have had the assistance as regards facts, policy and nomenclature first of Mr. J. P. Mills, C.I.E., I.C.S., Governor's Secretary throughout my term of office, who served for many years in that district and who besides being an able administrator, has made himself an authority on Naga custom and folklore : and secondly, of Mr. C. R. Pawsey, M.C., I.C.S., the present Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills, of which area he has had 10 years' experience. So far as the history of the Lushai Hills is concerned, Major A. G. McCall, I.C.S., Superintendent of the

Lushai Hills from 1932 to 1942, has checked the manuscript, supplied information from his own records and experience, and given most useful advice on the subject of the spelling of names.

For the Sadiya Frontier Tract, Mr. R. W. Godfrey, I.P., the present Political Officer, has checked my manuscript and given me useful criticism, while Captain G. S. Lightfoot, I.P., Political Officer, Balipara Frontier Tract, has performed a similar service so far as his district is concerned.

2. When Mackenzie's book was published the Naga Hills district (in a very embryo form) had only been formed a few years : the Lushai Hills district (at first organised in the form of two districts, North and South) was not to be constituted till 6 years later : while the two Frontier Tracts were not to come into existence until 1912, after the Abor Expedition. I have, however, for convenience, arranged these notes under the headings of their present-day districts.

3. As regards form, I have followed Mackenzie's example in introducing copious quotations from official documents. This has resulted in a certain amount of repetition, especially in the history of the Naga Hills, since so many important letters are of the "self-contained" variety and furnish a synopsis of past history as the background for present proposals. But perhaps this method gives clearer picture of what was in the minds of those who were grappling with particular problems at the time than something more abbreviated. These notes too are meant mainly for reference and more for use of members of the Administration than the general public.

THE LUSHAI HILLS

I. Introductory—Mackenzie's references to the Lushai Hills stop at the year 1883, when disturbing reports had been received by the Deputy Commissioner, Cachar, as to the intentions of the Lushais to raid under Khalgom (by modern appellation Kalkhama Sailo son of Suakpuilala)* and troops had been hurried up to strengthen the frontier.

At this time we did not attempt to administer the Lushai Hills, but the Deputy Commissioner, Cachar, whose district bordered the Lushai Hills on the north and west, was charged with political relations with the Lushai Chiefs, and had a Political Assistant (at that time Rai Bahadur Hari Charan Sarma) to aid him in these duties. Not many years, however, were to elapse before the inevitable happened and these unsatisfactory political relations were done away with and the Lushais were brought fully under British administration. The history of the Lushai Hills for all except a comparatively small portion of the period with which these notes deal, therefore, ceases to be what Mackenzie's work was, a "History of the relations of the Government with the Hill Tribes of the North-East Frontier of Bengal" but the histories of an Assam and a Bengal District and then that of an Assam one only, albeit a non-regulation one.

II. The Expedition of 1888-1889—The anticipation of serious trouble referred to in Mackenzie's concluding lines were not immediately fulfilled, but raids of varying degrees of seriousness continued in succeeding years, necessitating eventually the Expedition of 1888-89. On February 3rd, 1888 Lieutenant J. F. Stewart of the 1st Leinster Regiment, when in charge of a survey party, was attacked at a place only 18 miles from Rangamati, near the Saichul Range by men described at the time as "Shendus" (an Arracan appellation which does not

*Spelling of names in Lushai is a matter of considerable difficulty. In Mackenzie's book, for instance, many of the names are quite beyond identification, even by well informed Lushais. I have therefore, wherever possible, added after a name when it first occurs, the modern spelling in square brackets.

1. Military Report—Chin-Lushai Country, 1893. Pages 36-37, 41-42.
2. Military Report—Assam 1908.

really apply to any particular tribe), led by a chief named Housata [Haosata] and killed together with two British soldiers and one sepoy. Mr. Stewart apparently had not the smallest idea that any danger threatened and took no precautions whatsoever for the safety of himself or his party. A little later, on the 15th February, a raid was perpetrated on the village of Roazo Prenkhyn Mro in the Chema Valley, in which 6 persons were killed, 2 wounded, and 23 prisoners taken. This also was attributed to Shendus.

The Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, Mr. D. R. Lyall, in a letter, dated the 4th March 1888†, urged in the strongest terms that an expedition should be sent in the ensuing cold weather to exact punishment from the "Shendus" or Pois in a thorough and unmistakable way, in retribution for the long series of outrages which they had committed over so many years. After recounting these outrages and pointing out our entire inaction ever since the expedition of 1872-73 he observed as follows :—

"11... I think that a strong case for active reprisal has been made out.

12. From the earliest days of our connection with these hills, the officers best able to give an opinion have said that until the Shendoos were dealt with there would be no cessation of raiding.

The operations of 1872-73 caused a lull, but when once they began again in 1882 with the attack on Lalseva [Lalchheuva] which was clearly a feeler in order to see whether any notice would be taken, they have followed up with a raid almost every year, culminating in the attack on Lieutenant Stewart and his guard at a place only 18 miles as the crow flies from Rangamati.

13. The feeling of insecurity caused by these raids is reacting most injuriously on our revenues. The Hill Tracts revenue consists chiefly of tolls on hill produce, and these have gone down from Rs. 89,109 to Rs. 83,222 last year, and the amount collected will be even less this year. In fact Mr. Home does not expect it to exceed Rs. 50,000.

†Bengal Secretariat, Pol., A, June 1891, Nos. 1-139. File L/20, 1889.

Even in a financial point of view, an expedition ought, therefore, to go through the Shendoo country next year, but I urge the necessity on far higher grounds.

We are bound to protect the men living within our declared boundary, and not to avenge them would be a breach of faith. Lieutenant Stewart, too, was surveying ten miles from the boundary when attacked, and if these men be allowed to carry off from within our territory the heads of three white men with impunity, next year will doubtless be marked by even more savage raids. Mr. Murray says that every white man is held to be a Chief, and the recent raid is therefore the most successful they have ever made.

14. The report already submitted shows on what slight grounds a raid is committed. In the present case a quarrel between a savage and his wife on the banks of the Koladyne has caused the death of Lieutenant Stewart, two soldiers, and a sepoy within our territory, some 12 or 15 days' march distant, not to mention the affair in the Chaima Valley. Similarly, the death of a Chief may at any time cause a head-hunting expedition to come off; even the "chaff" of the village girls may send a body of young men off on the warpath for heads.

15. We are quite powerless in preventing such raids, and would be equally so if we had ten times our present force. In the kind of jungle which covers the hills a band of savages can always slip by unobserved, and the effect of our police guards is almost entirely moral. Their existence in fact serves to continue the remembrance of more severe lessons, such as the expedition of 1872-73, and they should also be able to cut off the retreat of raiders if we had a system of telegraphs, but the main safeguard against the recurrence of raids must always be the fear of punishment. A certain show of force is necessary to maintain this fear, but it would be most expensive and useless to maintain always on the frontier a force capable of punishing the most powerful tribes. The Shendoos think they are beyond our power to punish, and the more thoroughly we show them the baselessness of their belief, the more free shall we be from raids in the future.

It is for this reason that I advise three columns exploring

their country from every side. I feel sure that if this be not done the hills on the side of Burmah will become a refuge for the dacoits and bad characters of Burmah, and will be a continual thorn in our side."

In their letter No. 2576-P., dated the 3rd August 1888, the Government of Bengal fully endorsed Mr. Lyall's proposals, remarking that "it is plain that, as a matter of general policy, it will be impossible to avoid the adoption of punitive measures sooner or later, and Mr. Edgar has shown conclusive reasons against postponing it".

The reference to Mr. (later Sir John) Edgar who was then Chief Secretary of Bengal, concerns a long* note which that officer had recorded on "Shendoo Raids on the Chittagong Hill Tracts" on 17th July 1888. This note gives a history and appreciation of the situation together with proposals for the future. The gist of it appears from the following extracts :

"The country is almost unexplored, and very little is known of it, except that it is a tract of most intricate hill range and impenetrable cane-brakes lying between Manipur and Cachar on the north, and the Arrakan Hill Tracts on the south, and between the Chindwin river on the east, and the Chittagong Hill Tracts and Hill Tipperah on the west. On the edges of this tract on all sides the hills are low, covered with dense forest and trackless jungle, the only paths being for the most part the beds of torrents. Further in the hills are much higher and more open, so that there would be less difficulty in exploring them. The villages of the inhabitants of the tract are, as a rule, situated on the higher hills. The people form a mingling of clans, speaking so far as I know, dialects of the same language, who are known to us by various names—Kookis, Lushais, Pois, Shendus, Chins, etc....Almost every village has its own Chief, who generally, however, owes some sort of allegiance to the most powerful Chief of the group of villages to which he belongs, whom I may, for convenience sake, call the head of his clan. From time to time the Chief of some subordinate village gets power and throws off his allegiance to his

* Asst. Secretary, Political and Judicial, A, Foreign Progs.,
 August 1888, Vol. I-44

former head, and founds a new clan for himself, which gets known sometimes by his name, sometimes by the name of the hill on which the Chief's village is situated, and sometimes by a variation of the original clan name. The people of these Chiefs change about from time to time, leaving a declining or feeble chief to settle under some one more able and energetic. Nothing does more to establish a Chief and bring him followers and influence than success in raids upon weaker Chiefs, upon the villages of Manipur, Hill Tipperah, and Upper Burma, or upon our villages and outposts of tea-gardens. The last are the most attractive of all, for there are more plunder and heads to be got there, with much less risk than elsewhere, especially now that our troops protect the villages of Upper Burma. In addition to the constant changes in the relative position of individual chiefs, a general movement would seem to take place from time to time amongst these people, apparently as if swarms were thrown off from the more crowded villages in the higher central hills, such swarms forming new communities all round the outer fringe of the tract, and in doing so driving before them the villages which had previously inhabited this fringe. The inhabitants of them are compelled, in consequence of the pressure, to take refuge in our territory or in Tipperah or Manipur, where they are often followed, themselves killed or taken captive and their villages plundered by the new-comers. This seems to have been the origin of what is called the great Kooki rising of 1849 and 1850, as it certainly was of the great series of raids in 1860-61.

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"But, apart from the danger to our tea-gardens, it is almost certain that, if no punishment is inflicted on account of the successful raids of the past year, the offending villages will be emboldened to make more extensive attacks on all parts of the frontier next year or the year after. It seems clear, therefore, that punitive measures are imperatively called for, and the only question is the form they should take.

Mr. Lyall has proposed that a column from Burma and a column from Demagiri should meet near what has until lately been supposed to be the most easterly branch of the Koladyne,

but which is now known to be a confluent of the Myetta, and that a third column should effect a junction with these from the south...but I gather the Chief Commissioner of Burma would not be likely to support such a project, and as it seems to me that the punishment of the perpetrators of the outrage on Lieutenant Stewart's party, and, if possible, of the Chima Valley raiders, is of paramount importance, I should therefore confine our present proposals to effecting these objects. In order to punish Housata and Jahoota [Zahuata] I should propose to despatch a small column from Demagiri, which should advance in the direction of the offending villages, possibly using the villages of Sayipuiya [Seipuia] and Vandula as a base should these be found friendly and unmistakably to be trusted, and not attacking any of the other villages on the route unless active opposition from them were met with. On arriving at the hills occupied by Housata and Jahoota, the force should remain there until they had reduced the offending Chiefs and their people to submission, and inflicted on them such punishment as might be considered necessary. If possible, a portion of the force should be detached to march against the villages of the Tlangai [this was the chief clan among the Lakhers] in order to punish the Chima Valley outrage, and to recover the prisoners then taken.

...Of one thing I am absolutely convinced. Any plan for dealing with these hillmen should be worked in concert by the Governments of Bengal, Assam and Burma. No mistake can be greater than for each of these Governments to deal separately with the villagers adjoining its own frontier without reference to those in the vicinity of the other two Governments, or in the centre of the tract, because the effect of this would be merely to divert attacks from one portion of the frontier to another, while doing nothing to remedy the real source of the evil which I take to be the belief of the inhabitants of the higher central hills in the inviolability of their country and their safety from danger of punishment. It would be very easy to put an end to all this if the Governments of all surrounding countries were to unite in a steady continuous attempt to open

up this unknown tract, and to make its inhabitants feel that they were surrounded on all sides, by a single government, with a single aim and a single method of working."

The Chief Commissioner of Assam in his letter No. 2574* dated the 7th September 1888 fully supported the Bengal proposal, but the Supreme Government in their letter No. 1889-E† of the 24th September 1888 intimated that they considered that their position in the Chindwin districts of Burma was not yet sufficiently consolidated to allow then of a "satisfactorily full and permanent development of the objects which a joint expedition from Chittagong and Burma might be expected to secure", and for this and other reasons they were not going to undertake an expedition. This decision evoked the strongest protest from Mr. Lyall who, writing on the 26th September 1888, said our inaction would be misunderstood by the trans-frontier tribes; we should have to expect fresh raids; the frontier police must be strengthened at once, a telegraph line between Demagiri and Rangamati being indispensable as well as from the latter place to Chittagong; while revenue would suffer owing to apprehension among the tribes within the frontier. The Lieutenant-Governor in his letter No. 140-PD†, dated the 15th October 1888, strongly supported all the Commissioner's proposals, adding that the local non-officials and planters and business men as well had represented the danger to which the frontier was exposed. As a result of these protests the frontier forces were strengthened and a detachment of the 9th Bengal Infantry left for Chittagong on the 8th November 1888, but the Government of India in their reply to Bengal on the 7th November said that they were unable to modify their previous orders about an expedition. The Government of Bengal again represented the matter in their letter No. 2726-P†, dated the 10th December, 1888, in which they reported a new development, i.e., the possibility of the hitherto loyal Chief Sayipua being alienated owing to our inaction, a fact which "would not merely greatly increase the

* Assam Secretariat, Political and Judicial, A, Foreign Progs., Nos. 1-46, August 1890.

† Bengal File No. L/20 of 1889,

difficulties of any future expedition but would bring the dangers of attacks on our villages during the present season very much nearer". They were satisfied that a spirit of unrest prevailed on this border, and though they hesitated to reopen the question they felt it was their duty to state the facts, so that the Government of India could make up their minds before the season became too far advanced.

The question was, in fact, settled by the tribesmen themselves. On the 13th December 1888 occurred the raid on Pakuma Ram's village, within our territory and only 4 miles from Demagiri, when the Rani and 21 men were killed, 13 heads taken and 15 captives carried off. This raid introduced a new factor into the situation in that it was committed by men from a direction hitherto not taken into consideration. (It was ascertained a year later that it had been carried out by the sons of the Lushai Chief Vuta, who inhabited country round about the places now known as Tachip and Phulpui. There was, therefore, every reason to view with some apprehension this new source of raiders, their country being 50 or 60 miles distant, as the crow flies, from the Rani's village). In forwarding the information regarding this outrage in his letter No. 2734*, dated the 17th December 1888* and urging the necessity of punitive measures, the Lieutenant-Governor gave his views as to the general policy which should be adopted for the future in the following terms.

"4 ..The policy which has been followed since 1872 owed its acceptance to the fact that the Lushai Hills formed a real frontier, having beyond them the territories of Upper Burma, and that the occupation of these hills would have brought us into immediate proximity to the tribes then imperfectly controlled by the Burmese Government. There were manifest objections to this, but since Upper Burma has been incorporated with our own territories, the political conditions affecting this tract of country have been changed. It is now surrounded on all sides by our settled districts, or by petty States under our immediate control. We cannot permit the continuance in our

midst of groups of head-taking savages without responsible Chiefs, without organisation, and not amenable to political control, who yet from their geographical position are enabled to commit outrages with practical impunity upon our territory on all sides of them ; while we are put to great and constantly increasing expense to maintain lines of defence which prove ineffectual to protect our peaceful people.

5. The alternative policy which commends itself to the Lieutenant-Governor is to undertake the permanent pacification of the whole tract by means of roads run through it, and the substitution, for the present line of comparatively weak guards, of a central dominant post with an adequate military reserve, and such outposts as might be found necessary. The whole tract should be eventually brought under the control of a single officer stationed at the central post above mentioned. It is needless to point out that a similar policy has proved successful in many parts of India, as for instance, in the Garo, the Naga and the Cossyah Hills ..”

As regards immediate action, he did not, owing to the lateness of the season, advocate sending two expeditions into the Lushai country but advised that one only should be sent to the east to punish Houseata and his associates.

The Expedition of 1889—The Government of India agreed that this fresh and atrocious outrage made it “necessary that active measures should be immediately undertaken” (their letter No. 2424-E* dated the 19th December 1888), and stated their view of the purpose of the operations as follows. “4. The object of the expedition is essentially to prevent raiding. The primary objective of the force will be Sayipuia’s village, and it will, as proposed by the Government of Bengal, proceed as far eastwards as may be possible with a view to operations against Howsata’s and Jahuta’s villages if time and the season permit. Communications will be maintained by means of a road to be made from Demagiri as the force advances and the Officer in Command will be instructed to select, if such can be found, a dominant central position suitable for the location of sufficient force, and capable of being held throughout the

* Bengal File No. L/20 of 1889.

coming rains and hot weather. A line of telegraph will also be immediately constructed between Chittagong and Rangamatti to Demagiri".

Demagiri was made the base and our troops commenced to penetrate into the country in January 1889. The operations were under the command of Colonel F. V. G. Tregar of the 9th Bengal Infantry with Mr. Lyall, the Commissioner as Civil Political Officer and Messrs. G. A. S. Bedford and C. S. Murray as Assistant Political Officers. Captain J. Shakespear was employed as Intelligence Officer. About 1,150 men were engaged, including 200 men of the 2nd Madras Pioneers, 250 men of the 2nd Bengal Infantry, 400 men of the 2/2nd Gurkha Rifles, and 250 men of the 9th Bengal Infantry, who were already in the country; together with two mountain guns.

The course of the operations is described in Mr. Lyall's letter, No. 492-H. T., dated the 5th May 1889*. The 17th February 1889 saw matters sufficiently organised for a party consisting of 100 men with Mr. Murray and Captain Shakespear to visit Sayipua's village who was now convinced that we meant business and gave his whole support to our demands. Murray then went on to Vandula's where he was well received, and heard news of Howsata's death. The advance on Howsata's village was commenced on 14th March, starting from the fort which had been established at Lungleh. (Lungleh was described as "a hill 3,500 feet high in the neighbourhood of the village at present [1889] inhabited by Saipuya".) Jahuta's village was reached on the 19th March and Howsata's on the 20th. Howsata's grave was examined and underneath his body was found Lieutenant Stewart's gun, proving, as Mr. Lyall's report says, "that he had punished the right men." The village was destroyed, and so was Jahuta's.

On the 3rd April a durbar of Chiefs was held. It was attended by the 3 great Howlang (Haulawng) Chiefs, Saipuya, Lal Thanglung (Lalthanglung), Lalunga, Vandula's son [Langlung] and Laluma. These represented the chiefs of the southern Howlungs and they gave undertaking of loyalty. As Mr. Lyall observed in his report, this was

excellent as far as it went, but the Shendoos, owing to the lateness of the season, could not, except for the burning of the deserted villages of Howsata and Jahuta, be fully dealt with. Be that as it may, by the 16th April substantial punishment had been exacted, Fort Lungleh had been established, a road constructed, and it was possible to withdraw, leaving a garrison of one British Officer and 212 men of the Frontier Police in occupation of Lungleh.

III. The Chin-Lushai Expedition of 1889-90—The Lieutenant-Governor reviewed these results and considered what should be done in the ensuing season's operations in Chief Secretary Sir John Edgar's letter No. 19-PD*, dated the 3rd June 1889. His conclusion was "that the first object of the operations to be undertaken next year must be to reduce the Shendoos to submission, to recover the remainder of the arms, and the heads taken when Lieutenant Stewart was killed, and also to release captives taken in 1883 from the village of the Lushai Chief Lalsiva... This, however, should only be a subsidiary object. The main scheme of operation next season should be devoted to the release of the captives carried away in the raids on the village of Pakuma Rani and those in the Chengri Valley, and to the infliction of such punishment on the perpetrators of these atrocious outrages as may suffice to prevent the commission of similar raids in the future."

The reference to the Chengri Valley concerned the following incident. On the 8th January 1889 a party of about 600 men led by Lengpunga (or Lianphunga) and his brother Zarok (Zahrawka), sons of Sukpilal (Suakpuilala) had descended on the valley which lay on the Chittagong Frontier and within 2 marches of Rangamati, burnt 24 villages, killed 101 persons and carried off 91 captives. Two contemporary letters give interesting details regarding the habits of the raiders. Writing on February 26th, 1889, Mr. L. R. Forbes, Deputy Commissioner, Chittagong Hill Tracts, says—

"I beg to state that according to the lists furnished the number carried off amounts to 91, viz., 76 in captivity and 15

* Bengal File No. L/20 of 1889,

ransomed or escaped. In addition to these there are those that were sacrificed on reaching the Chief's village and those said to have committed suicide. Besides these the Manager (Chakma and Mong Rajah's circles) states there may be more but owing to migration to Hill Tipperah he has not been able to get information. Lengphunga (Lianphunga) I see has given up 64 captives if to these are added the 15 escaped and transferred there remains a very large number for sacrificed and suicide."

Writing on July 13th, 1889 to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, Cachar, Mr. J. D. Anderson says ;—

"2 Lengpunga's own account of the Chengri Valley raid appears to be as follows :—While Zarok ruled a separate village, he laid claim to the land of the Chengri Valley people, and informed them that, inasmuch as they were not tributary either to the British Government, or to the Maharajah of Tipperah, he intended to assert his rights to their lands as an elephant-hunting ground. Shortly after this, some of the Chengri Valley Kukis hovered about Zarok's *jhum* cultivation and scared his women and children. Zarok took counsel with his brother, Lengpunga who (he candidly admits) advised him that it was his bounden duty to subjugate the Kukis, and for that purpose lent him some of his young men. Lengpunga admits that eight souls, seven women and a boy were released two months ago, being ransomed by a "jemadar from Chittagong". He says this person paid down Rs. 185 in cash, and promised to pay Rs. 515 subsequently ; the latter sum to be treated as a loan from Lengpunga to him at a rate of 10 per cent. per mensem. He (Lengpunga) has received no money subsequently and says that, if more money be not forthcoming in two months' time, he will raid again. At least such is the report of my informant, who seems to have been much impressed by the Chief's truculent demeanour. Our messengers were allowed free access to the captives who gave them a full account of how they were captured and carried off. They as well as their captors are suffering considerably from scarcity of food—they more than the Lushais however, inasmuch as they are not accustomed to Lushai messes of jungle leaves, etc. In other respects they appear to be treated

fairly well. They give a deplorable account of the journey to Lengpunga's village after they were taken captives. The babies of nursing women (who could not carry other loads than their children) were taken from them and butchered before their eyes. When they got to Lengpunga's pungi, seven of them were sacrificed in the presence of rest, and then (repeating the action) 'we put our hands to our eyes lest we should see any more'. So their words are reported to me.

3. Lengpunga sturdily refused to let any captives go. The Deputy Commissioner of Cachar was 'his father', and so forth but the Chengri Valley affair had cost him Rs. 3,300, and if that sum were not paid, he was not going to let his victims go. These, according to his own account, are 55 in number ; but the Kukis themselves say that they know of 70 still surviving, and think there may be more in confinement of whom they know nothing."

Sir Steuart Bayley advised as follows regarding the conduct of the expedition.

"...While, as before urged, steps should be taken at the outset to reduce the Shendoos to submission, our main advance should not be towards their villages but should be directed northward along the hills overhanging the Dallesari [known now-a-days as the Dhaleswari or Tlang], until some commanding point could be occupied from which the villages implicated in the Chengri Valley outrage could be effectually visited and punished. When the people inhabiting the villages on both sides of Dallesari, and as far as the Sunai, have been reduced to complete submission, an advance should be made to the east, and the villages belonging to the sons of Bhuta [Vuta] should be dealt with in the same thorough-going manner as has proved so effectual this year in the case of Kamhows and other tribes of the Burmese frontier .. No attempt should be made without more complete knowledge of the country than we have at present to lay out the permanent road which will eventually have to be made between some point in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and some point on the frontier of Burma, and the Lieutenant Governor, as at present advised, is very doubtful whether the direction of such a road would coincide with the line of advance

which must be adopted by us next season ; but it is probably that hereafter the first portion of the road from Lungleh towards the villages of Lengpunga and Zarock could be extended to Cachar, and so form means of communication between that district and the Chittagong Hill Tracts, which would in any case be a necessary portion of the scheme for the permanent pacification of the Lushai tribes advocated in my letter above quoted."

The Government of India decided on the 11th September 1889* that operations should take place. The general plan was that a Chittagong Column should move via Lungleh to Haka, meeting a Burma Column coming from Gangaw via Yokwa, a column from the former force to go north to punish the raiders on the Chengri Valley and Pakuma Rani. This was the expedition known as the Chin-Lushai Expedition of 1889-90. It was on a bigger scale than that of 1888-89 and Bengal, Burma and Assam all took part. The "Scheme** of Operations" drawn up by the Quarter Master General which was approved by the Government of India stated the object of the expedition thus : "The object of the expedition will be, firstly, punitively visit certain tribes that have raided and committed depredations in British territory, and have declined to make amends or to come to terms ; secondly to subjugate tribes as yet neutral, but now, by force of circumstances brought within the sphere of British dominion ; thirdly, to explore and open out as much as can be done in the time, the, as yet only partly known, country between Burma and Chittagong ; and, lastly, if the necessity arises, to establish semi-permanent posts in the regions visited so as to ensure complete pacification and recognition of British power."

The Chittagong Column based on Demagiri was under the command of Colonel Tregear and the 3,400 men engaged included the 3rd Bengal Infantry, 2/2nd Gurkha Rifles, the 28th Bombay Infantry (Pioneers), and detachments of the 2/4th

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Gurkha Rifles, the 9th Bengal Infantry, the Bengal Sappers and Miners and the Chittagong Frontier Police. Captain J. Shakespear was again attached as Field Intelligence Officer. From this force a column about 800 strong, referred to as the "Northern Column" in the correspondence of the period, under Colonel G. J. Skinner of the 3rd Bengal Infantry, accompanied by Mr. C. S. Murray as Political Officer, was detached to the north-west principally in order to punish the raiders on the Chengri Valley and on Pakuma Rani's village.

Simultaneously with these movements in the south, a force composed of 400 men of the Surma Valley Battalion of Military Police under their Commandant, Mr. W. W. Daly, a police officer, was organised from Cachar with order to recover the captives taken in, and punish Liengpunga for the raid on the Chengri Valley ; to punish Vutais' [Vuttaia] sons for the raid on Pakuma Rani's villages ; and to establish a permanent post in the vicinity of Liengpunga's village. The organisation of this force was undertaken in close consultation between Bengal and Assam, and Mr. Daly's instructions were agreed upon at a conference* held at the Lieutenant-Governor's residence at Belvedere in Calcutta on 15 th January 1890 at which the Lieutenat Governor of Bengal, the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief Commissioner of Assam and Sir John Edgar, Chief Secretary of Bengal were present. They were as follows :—

"(1) Establish a stockaded godown, with the sufficient guard, at Changsil or any other place Daly considers preferable in the direction of Lengpunga's village.

(2) Collect all the information he can, and prospect for the road towards Lengpunga.

(3) As soon as he can, open up communications with the Northern Column, and, when communications are opened, place, him self under the Officer Commanding the Column.

(4) Meanwhile, when everything is made perfectly secure, Daly is not precluded from advancing against Lengpunga, with

* Assam Secretariat, Political and Judicial, A, Military Proceedings, October 1890, Nos. 4-10.

† Assam Secretariat, Political and Judicial, A, Military Proceedings, August 1890, Nos. 68-152.

the special object of punishing Lengpunga as completely and severely as his means permit, unless Lengpunga surrenders himself unconditionally, and gives up all captives.

(5) There is no objection to Daly's receiving friendly overtures from other villages which did not take part in the recent raids".

Mr. Daly was accompanied by 3 British Officers, Messrs. J. R. Carnac, and L. St. J. Brodrick of the Assam Police, and Mr. S. N. Walker of the Bengal Police, with Dr. Patridge and subsequently Surgeon Coleman of the 43rd Gurkha Rifles, as Medical Officers. Mr. Daly left his base camp at Jhalnacheria in Cachar on the 18th January 1890, reached Changsil on the 24th January and joined hands with Colonel Skinner's column on the 11th February at Aijal. On the 30th, January, 58 of Lengpunga's captives were brought in to Changsil, to be followed by 5 more on the next day, while the last remaining captive, a young girl of about 8 years old, was brought in a good deal later on 9th February. "Thus" (to quote the Chief Commissioner's letter No. 2876-J.,* dated the 19th July 1890, to the Government of India) "the recovery of the Chengri valley captives, one of most important objects of the expedition was completely and expeditiously attained without bloodshed." On February 4th, Mr. Daly reached the Aijal range and built a stockade on a site which he describes as "a good one for a permanent post", and which eventually became the site of the headquarters of the Lushai Hills District. On the 8th he advanced on Lengpunga's village some 16 miles south of Aijal, not far distant from the present-day village of Tachhip. Here he had an interview with the Chief but did not place him under arrest. Three days later Colonel Skinner's Northern Column arrived, and Mr. Daly thenceforth came under his orders. Lengpunga then fled and it was some time before he came again in contact with our officers. The failure to apprehend Lengpunga led to a good deal of correspondence, Daly's†

* Bengal Secretariat, Political, A, June 1891, Nos. 1-34, File IL/50 of 1890.

†Bengal File No. IL-50 of 1890.

explanation was that the man had come into his camp only after persuasion by the Political Jamadar, Shib Charan, and on a solemn promise that he would not be detained. Daly, therefore, was unwilling to break faith with him by seizing him. He got him to promise, however on condition his life was spared, to give himself up when Colonel Skinner's Column arrived. But the man alarmed at learning of the approach of the Column, would not come in. Daly then made arrangements to try and capture him. But Colonel Skinner's Column arrived earlier than expected, and Lengpunga took to flight. The Chief Commissioner, however, and the Government of Bengal were both sufficiently satisfied that Daly acted rightly.

There was no opposition worthy of the name throughout these operations which were completed in March 1890, and, apart from the rescue of the Chengri Valley captives, the main work achieved was to establish posts and organise communications. The Assam Column established posts at Aijal (on the range on which Lengpunga's village lay) and Changsil, while in the south, Fort Tregear, east of Lungleh on the Darjow [Darzo] Range, was established and Fort Lungleh was improved.

In reviewing the results of the expedition, the Adjutant-General in his report No. 4179-A.,* dated the 16th July 1890, said—

“3. [The objects of the expedition] have been attained by the expedition in a most complete manner, and his Excellency cannot too highly bring to the notice of the Government of India the excellent conduct of all concerned, in having so cheerfully borne the hardships and overcome the difficulties which had to be encountered—difficulties which were considerably enhanced by the physical condition of the country and the severe sickness which attacked the force, and which crippled the Burma columns to almost a dangerous extent.

4. In such adverse circumstances, the results which have attended the operations of the expedition must be regarded as eminently satisfactory ; for not only has communication

* Bengal Secretariat, Political, A, June 1891, Nos. 1-34, File IL./50- of 1890.

between Bengal and Burma been established, and the tribes which had previously given annoyance fittingly dealt with, but all the principal tribes inhabiting the country have been brought under subjugation, a large number of captives who had been in the hands of these tribes restored to their own homes,—and military posts at certain places for the preservation of order, and as evidence of British supremacy, established”.

The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal in his letter No. 39-P. R. T.,* dated the 19th August 1890, agreed with this view so far as the punishment of Howsata, Paona and Jahuta was concerned, and said that there was not much “left to be done in the way of punishment in connexion with the tribes under Lengpunga and the sons of Vutai who were responsible for the raids on the Pukuma Rani’s village and on the Chengri Valley”. He was still of opinion, however, that a further expedition in the ensuing cold weather was required against the tribes occupying the loop of the Koladyne, to whom had been traced responsibility for the raid on the Chima Valley (of the 15th February 1888). This, as it turned out, did not become necessary as 5 villages concerned themselves surrendered.

A reference to the future administration of these hills is made in paragraph 3 of the same letter in the following terms.

“3. The suggestion, however, for separating the Bengal portion of this territory entirely from the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and transferring to it the frontier police of the latter district (which would thereafter be manned only by civil police), and for placing the new district under a separate political agency controlled by the Commissioner of Chittagong, is one which commends itself to the Lieutenant-Governor. It has already been carried out to some extent, and when certain financial and legal details have been worked out, the Lieutenant-Governor will address the Government of India with a view to give full effect to the proposal.”

On the administrative side these operations led to the creation of the 2 districts of the North Lushai Hills and South

* Bengal File No. IL-50 of 1890,

Lushai Hills, with headquarters at Aijal and Lungleh respectively. The North Lushai Hills became part of the Chief Commissionership of Assam, while the southern district was attached to Bengal.

IV. The North Lushai Hills District—The future of this area was the subject of discussion before the conclusion of the Chin-Lushai operations, and in February 1890* the Chief Commissioner of Assam, Mr. J. W. Quinton, caused inquiries to be made from Mr. Daly, who was then in Aijal, as to details of the garrison necessary and so on, as he had reason to believe that "a proposal will be made to him to take over in some form or other, the administration of the North Lushai country". The final proposals for the control of the Northern portion of the Lushai Hills are contained in Mr. Quinton's letter† No. 1830-P., dated the 15th May 1890. One important point, that of the method of exercising control, is dealt with as follows.

"...Mr. Quinton was,...satisfied that the mere occupation by a police force of certain points in the tract referred to would not in itself be sufficient to bring under our influence the chief with whom we have been so lately in collision, and that, if this object was to be adequately attained, it was essential that an officer, possessing both experience and judgment, should be at the same time appointed to feel his way among the people, and gradually accustom them to our control. It is quite impossible to employ the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar for this propose. It is true that our intercourse with the Lushais has hitherto been conducted under the control of that officer, but such intercourse has been only very slight, and our dealings with the Lushais have been few and infrequent. This state of things has, however, been completely altered by the late expedition, and the Deputy Commissioner could not, consistently with the due performance of his other duties, spare the time required for the closer control and more constant communication, from which alone the extension of our influence over the tribes concerned can be looked for. Accordingly, the Chief Commissioner has

* Assam Secretariat, Military, B, Progs. August 1890, Nos. 106-114.

† Assam Secretariat, Political and Judicial, A, Foreign Progs. August 1890, Nos. 47-77.

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deputed a separate officer, and has selected for this purpose Captain H. R. Browne, Officiating Assistant Commissioner of the First Grade, and subject to the confirmation of the Government of India has appointed him Political Officer in the Northern frontier country...."

His Chief Commissioner's proposals were accepted by the Government of India in their letter No. 1391,* dated the 3rd July 1890 of which the following is an extract :—

"...the measures you recommend contemplate—

- (1) The employment of 300 men of the Frontier Police to hold the tract of country, which will henceforth be under your control.
- (2) The appointment of a Political Officer to conduct our relations with the tribes. The officer selected for this duty is Captain H. R. Browne, and it is proposed to grant him a salary of Rs. 1,000 a month, leaving his vacancy in the Assam Commission unfilled for the present.
- (3) The appointment of an Assistant Commandant of the Surma Valley Police Battalion. A young military officer will be selected for this post, and receive a staff allowance of Rs. 200 a month in addition to the military pay of his rank.
- (4) The appointment of an European medical officer with the pay attached to a first-class civil station.
- (5) The organisation of a coolie corps of 100 men, who will receive Rs. 10 a month with free rations, and the maintenance of a small reserve of boat carriage between Jhainacherra and Changsil.

* * * *

4. It is observed from the second paragraph of your letter under reply, that you concur in the opinion of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal that it would be premature at present to fix any geographical boundary between Bengal and Assam. The control of the villages of the descendants of

Lalul will, however, come under your jurisdiction. I am to say that the Government of India agree to this arrangement as a temporary measure, until fuller information of the country in question shall have been obtained. As regards the boundary between Assam and Burma, I am to forward a copy of a telegram* from the Chief Commissioner of Burma, and to state that the Government of India concurs in the views as therein set forth. The Tashons will accordingly remain under the control of the authorities in Burmah for the present."

Curiously enough, it was not until the 6th September 1895 that the *de facto* position as regards the administration of the North Lushai Hills districts, which had persisted since 1890 apparently without formal legal sanction, was regularised by a proclamation, No. 1698-E., made by the Governor-General in Council.

Captain Browne, who had lately been Personal Assistant to the Chief Commissioner, arrived at Aijal in May 1890 in the appointment of Political Officer. His instructions were contained in the Chief Commissioner's letter No. 1468-P.,† dated the 22nd April 1890, and ran as follows :—

"I am directed by the Chief Commissioner to communicate, for your information and guidance, the following instructions—

1. Your headquarters will be at Fort Aijal but you should keep moving about among the chiefs with the object of establishing political influence and control over them, and inducing them to submit themselves gradually to our rule. As far as your means will allow, you should further endeavour to put down open raidings to protect our friends, and to punish those who injure them. You will otherwise not be strict to mark what is amiss or attempt to introduce a criminal administration, which, under existing circumstances, you are not in a position to enforce. You will leave the inhabitants, as far as possible, to settle their own affairs among themselves. For the present, you should consider as coming within the scope of your influence the tribes inhabiting the tract lying between the Cachar

* No. 367, dated the 7th June 1890.

† Assam Secretariat, Foreign A Proceedings, June 1891, Nos. 5-9.

Frontier on the north, Hill Tipperah on the west, the Manipur river on the east, and on the south an imaginary line drawn east and west through the Darlung Peak. It is desirable that you should, if possible, open communications with the officers who will represent the Bengal and Burma Governments at Fort Lungleh, Fort Tregear, Haka and Fort White. You should also take every opportunity of procuring information regarding the numerical strength of the several tribes with whom you may come into contact from time to time, and regarding such matters as their tribal customs and organisation, particulars of which may be of considerable use hereafter.

2. After your arrival at Fort Aijal, you will take up and enquire fully into the question of the complicity of Lempunga in the Chengri Valley raid, and submit a full report on the subject to the Chief Commissioner, containing any recommendations you consider fitting as to Lempunga's punishment.

3. If, as the Chief Commissioner understands from Mr. Daly to be the case, some of the Chiefs are willing or anxious to pay revenue or tribute, you will receive it in money or kind as tendered, subject to the orders of the Chief Commissioner, and you will endeavour to induce others to follow their example ; but no attempt should be made at present to exact revenue or tribute from tribes unwilling to pay it. You should report fully in due course what you find the position to be in regard to the willingness or otherwise of the tribes to pay revenue or tribute ; and, pending the final orders of the Chief Commissioner, you should be careful not to accept, in return for the payment of revenue or tribute, any obligations of a nature which might render their future fulfilment a matter of difficulty.

4. You should re-open the bazar at Changsil if, as the Chief Commissioner understands to be the case, the Lushais are anxious for its re-establishment, and, so far as is practicable during the rainy season, you should examine the country between Changsil and our frontier, with a view to advise upon the alignment of the road which must ultimately be made to connect Cachar with Lushai-land.

5. You will exercise the powers of a Deputy Commissioner over the police quartered within the tract described

in paragraph 1 as coming within the scope of your influence.

6. You will correspond directly with the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, to whom you will submit weekly diaries. Any important matters, or any matters which may appear to you to require orders, should be reported separately for the consideration of the Chief Commissioner".*

A subsequent letter of the same date informed him that the Political establishment hitherto attached to office of the Deputy Commissioner, Cachar, would be transferred to his office.

The Western Lushai Chiefs were restive and were determined neither to pay revenue nor to supply labour, and objected to the punishment of Lengpunga, which, as Captain Browne announced in a Durbar of Chiefs held on 14th June 1890, was to be deposition for 4 years. (This Durbar was held on the mound on which Aijal Jail now stands.) Their dissatisfaction culminated on 9th September 1890 in the ambushing of Captain Browne on his way down from Aijal to Changsil, at a point only 2 miles from Changsil. Apparently he had taken no special precautions against attack, being accompanied by a small party of only 4 police sepoy. Three of his men were killed and Captain Browne himself succumbed to loss of blood from three severe wounds in the arm fifteen minutes after reaching the Changsil stockade. An attack was made on the same day on another party consisting of sepoy and coolies between Aijal and Sairang and 11 of them killed. This outbreak was evidently quite unexpected by the local officers and it is possible that the immediate cause of its sudden occurrence may be found in the opinion expressed by Sir Frederick Roberts then Commander-in-Chief in India, that the assaults on Changsil and Fort Aijal were the result of a "great drink on the part of the tribes and to the fact, stated in one of the late Captain Browne's diaries, that the neighbouring Lushais had been considerably excited at the prospect of some revenue being demanded from

* Assam Secretariat, Political and Judicial. A, Foreign Progs. October 1890, Nos. 1-135.

Assam Secretariat, Foreign, A, August 1891, Nos. 30-38.

Assam Secretariat, Foreign, A, May 1892, Nos. 3-110.

them". Aijal and Changsil were immediately besieged by the Lushais, the former being commanded by Surgeon H. B. Melville, I.M.S., and the latter by Lieutenant H.W.G Cole [Later Sir Harry Cole] Commandant of the Surma Valley Military Police Battalion, who had with him 170 Military Police. A Relief Force of 200 men of the Surma Valley Military Police was sent up from Silchar at once with Lieutenant A. C. Tytler, Assistant Commandant, in command and accompanied also by Lieutenant R. R. Swinton of the 44th Bengal Infantry, Mr. A. W. Shuttleworth, Assistant Superintendent of Police, and Dr. Whitchurch, I.M.S. Swinton was unfortunately killed on the 26th September in a fight which took place as the force was making their way up the Dhaleswari river towards Changsil. On the 28th Changsil was relieved. In referring to the defence of Changsil on this occasion, Mr. Quinton, Chief Commissioner of Assam, observed that—"Lieutenant Cole on this sudden emergency exhibited great coolness and sound judgment to which it is probably mainly owing that the garrison was not surprised and cut off" On the 2nd October Cole and Tytler started to the relief of Aijal accompanied by a force under the command of Lieutenant Watson of the 40th Bengal Infantry. They reached that place on the 4th October and brought Dr. Melville's arduous labours to an end. Dr. Melville was deservedly commended by the Chief Commissioner for the way in which he defended the place in the following terms—(Chief Commissioner's letter No 4346-P,* dated 20th October 1890) "The Chief Commissioner would bring to the special notice of the Government of India the excellent services rendered by that young medical officer in circumstances so novel and foreign to the sphere of his proper duties.* He had been invested since the 9th September and his small garrison of 110 native officers and men and 43 others had suffered great hardships from wet and cold, constant duty, shortage of food and want of warm clothing. It was stated in Melville's diary that 5 out of every 6 men had no warm clothing at all.

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Meanwhile, Mr. R. B. McCabe, I. C. S., had been transferred from the post of Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur to be Political Officer in succession to Captain Browne. He lost no time in setting out and with Captain Williamson of the Commissariat, he arrived at Changsil on 5th October where he found Mr. A. W. Shuttleworth in command.

The operations undertaken to subdue the country were rapid and successful. By the end of the year all offending villages had been destroyed; the Lushais had suffered some 50 casualties; fines in guns had been realised and great losses in property had been inflicted. The opposition encountered was in fact not very serious and our casualties were nil. In the last days of November and first days of December, Lenkhunga [Liankunga], Lalrhima [Lalrhima], Sailenpui [Sailianpuia], Thangula [Thanghula], Lenpunga, and Khalkam had all surrendered. It was Lenkhunga's men who were responsible for the death of both Captain Browne and Mr. Swinton, but Lalrhima was also implicated and it was he who eventually surrendered much of Captain Browne's personal property. The action which resulted in the taking of Khalkam's village was well-planned and was carried out by a combined movement of forces from the direction of both Aijal and Changsil. Khalkam fled but 5 days later gave himself up to McCabe's "inexpressible delight", as he put in his letter of the 23rd November 1890.*

McCabe's appreciation of these events is contained in his letter No. 13 dated the 19th January 1891*, of which the following is a quotation :—

"As far as I have been able to ascertain, the Western Lushais under the headship of Sukpial, formed decidedly the most powerful combination of villages in these hills. After his death, about 1880-81, the chieftainship devolved on Khalkam, who has, from that date, virtually assumed control of this section of the Lushais, and has been more than able to hold his own against aggressive action on the part of the tribes east of the Sonai. I have noted with astonishment the blind submission rendered to these Lushai Rajas by their dependents, combining a feeling of

* Assam Secretariat, Foreign, A, May 1892, Nos. 3-110.

almost filial affection with one of fear, and considered that this is a factor that cannot be ignored in any future arrangements that may be made for the administration of these hills. It may, therefore, be safely argued that in punishing the chiefs we punish the prime movers and instigators of the late raid, and at the same time impress on the Lushais generally that they will have to seek a different source from which to derive their initiative in any of their future undertakings.

As long as Sukpilal was alive, we had only one unit to deal with, now we have his many descendants, who may be classified as follows in order of merit as regards the extent of their influence :—

- | | |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1. Khalkam [Kalkhama]. | 2. Lengpunga [Lianphunga]. |
| 3. Sailenpui [Sailianpuia]. | 4. Thanruma. |
| 5. Lenkhunga. | 6. Rankupa [Hrangkhupa]. |
| 7. Lalrhima. | 8. Thangula [Thanghula]. |
| 9. Lalsavuta. | 10. Thalien. |
| 11. Lalluia [Lalluaia]. | 12. Minthang [Hmingthanga]. |
| 13. Lenkhai [Liankhama]. | 14. Thompong [Thawmpawngal]. |
| 15. Tolera. | |

Of these, Lenkhunga, Rankupa, Lalrhima, Lalsavuta and Lalluia are mere boys, while Tolera, Minthang, Thompong, Thalien and Lenkhai are dependents of Sukpilal's family, so that we have only to deal with Khalkam, Lenkhunga [sic; this should be Lengpunga], Sailenpui, Thanruma, and Thangula as responsible agents. Thanruma is still at large, and his village is completely dispersed, and I do not anticipate that he will give us any trouble in the future.

As regards Sailenpui, I have no evidence against him sufficient to warrant his deportation, and from his previous history I am inclined to think that he is well disposed towards the British Government. The reports of the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar from 1880 up to date speak most favourably of him, and described him as influential, popular, and endowed with an aptitude for ruling. I had no occasion to attack his village, as he made a voluntary surrender, and he has given me great assistance with coolie labour, and proved that he could

command, even under adverse circumstances, immediate and implicit obedience to his orders.

In the interest of the future effective administration of these hills, it is necessary to utilize existing powers, and pending your sanction, I have, as a temporary measure, and without making any conditions or promises whatsoever, released Sailenpui, and told him that I will hold him responsible for the actions of the villages under his control.

This may appear at first sight a mild condoning of the late Lushai rising, but I think that, looking forward to the Government of the country with a minimised expense, the measure will meet with the approval of the Government of India. I have had an opportunity of seeing Sailenpui daily, of noting his personal influence, and have read carefully all his previous history. On these facts I have based my present plans, and consider that unless some responsible chief be released, I shall have to deal with scattered units, and for some years to come Government will find no one on whom responsibility can be thrown.

Khalkam was the leading spirit in the recent rising, and I consider that his deportation will have a good effect on the Lushai chiefs generally. Lengpunga has a bad record and the punishment inflicted on him last year does not seem to have proved an effective deterrent. He openly disregarded the orders of Government, rebuilt his villages, and threatened Lenkhai mantri, who had made himself popular with the Political Officer. During the present outbreak he has undoubtedly been one of our most subtle, though not prominent, opponents, and his presence in these hills would always prove a source of danger to us. Thangula Raja is Khalkam's step-brother and his right-hand man in the attacks on Aijal and Changsil. After careful deliberation, I have come to the conclusion that the deportation of Khalkam, Lengpunga, and Thangula will prove of salutary effect, and facilitate the administration of the Lushai Tribes."

The Chief Commissioner fully endorsed Mr. McCabe's advice in his letter No. 753-P.,* dated the 7th March, 1891, to the Government of India in the following words.

* Assam Secretariat Foreign, A, May 1892, Nos. 3-110.

“The Chief Commissioner...accepts fully Mr. McCabe's finding as to the guilt of the three chiefs whom he proposes to punish, viz., Khalkam, Lengpunga, and Thangula, and concurs in the course which the Political Officer has adopted, of leaving Sailenpui and the other chief descendants of Sukpial (except Thanruma) at large, and working through the former for the control and pacification of the country.

2. Khalkam, Lengpunga and Thangula have been deported and are now awaiting the final orders of the Government of India, in the Tezpur Jail, in accordance with warrants of commitment under Regulation III of 1818 forwarded by you and Thanruma, who lived close to Aijal and whose conduct was marked by special treachery towards Captain Browne, has fled. If arrested, he should be dealt with in the same way as the others. The Political Officer recommends that the three chiefs now in custody should be deported for a term limited to a defined number of years, and adds that he “thinks it advisable that the future good behaviour of the villages under the Rajas' control be made a condition on which the term of banishment should be based, as it is decidedly unwise to kill hope and let loose a number of out-laws in the district.” Mr. Quinton considers that the security of the British dominions, whether from foreign hostility or internal commotion, calls for the confinement of these men as State prisoners. They have all three taken prominent parts in the late rising.

3. Lengpunga was only three years ago the leader in a raid upon British subjects, which necessitated the despatch of a military expedition to inflict punishment on the guilty parties and give security to British districts, and all three were present at the Darbar at Fort Aijal on the 14th of June, and swore friendship with Captain Browne, promising to obey his orders and three months afterwards secretly rose in rebellion, killed Captain Browne and peaceful traders and coolies, and endeavoured to cut off our garrisons at Fort Aijal and Changsil. They are men of turbulent character and of great influence amongst their countrymen, and their past career shows that such influence is not likely to be used for any good purpose. Khalkam, by their own admissions, was the head of the

confederacy, and Thangula was his step-brother and right-hand man. The Chief Commissioner doubts whether Regulation III of 1818 authorises a sentence of imprisonment for a definite term on any person confined under its provisions, but he has no doubt that a long term must elapse before these three chiefs can safely be allowed to return to Lushai-land and have the opportunity of exciting to violence against their peaceful neighbours the restless tribes whom we are now endeavouring to bring under control. Mr. Quinton would suggest that the place of their deportation be changed from this Province, where they are in dangerous proximity to their own country, to the Andaman Islands, or some other place in British India where they may be under no temptation to escape from custody and may gradually acquire habits of peacefulness and industry."

The Government of India concurred and Khalkam, Lengpunga and Thangula were accordingly ordered to be detained for ten years under regulation III of 1818. The two former Chiefs hanged themselves in Hazaribagh Jail in the following September, an incident which caused little or no interest among their late subjects. The result of Mr. McCabe's expedition is described in the Report for the year 1891-92 as "The complete pacification of the North Lushai villages west of the Sonai river."

These operations against the western Chiefs were followed by the erection of a stockade at Sonai Bazar and a "promenade" in the Eastern Lushai country, i.e., on the east of the Sonai river. The purpose of this was not punitive, but rather exploratory so as to make the acquaintance of the Chiefs and to locate the sites of the different villages; and also to inform the tribes that they were now under the control of the British Government and that they would have to pay revenue. This "promenade" lasted from the 24th January up to the 5th March 1891 and McCabe took with him a force of 400 men of the 43rd Gurkha Light Infantry under Colonel Evans, (the same officer, no doubt, who presided over the Military Court of Inquiry set up in Manipur after the disastrous events of March 1891) and 20 Military Police. McCabe expressed himself, at any rate then, as entirely satisfied with the results, though he was careful to observe that

it was "too early to prognosticate what absolute effect this promenade on the Eastern Lushais would have or whether house-tax would be paid without demur after next harvest." Be that as it may, he could show that he had increased our topographical knowledge of the hills ; he had obtained local information about the country and the people ; he had entered into relations with the Chiefs, who had agreed to pay house-tax and supply rice and labour ; and he had shown that a force could march from village to village and rely upon obtaining Lushai coolies and supplies, the latter an important point.

In 1892 occurred the Eastern Lushai rising, the suppression of which necessitated an expedition on a considerable scale, Mr. McCabe was Political Officer of the North Lushai Hills at the time and his Report written some 6 weeks after the expedition had completed its work, and dated the 23rd July 1892*, contains some valuable historical information. He points out that from 1872 to 1892 the Eastern Lushais gave no trouble. He says that the rising appears to have been mainly due to the determination of one of the Chiefs, Lalbura, not to submit to the payment of house-tax or the supply of coolies and rice. The tax was easily realised from nearly all the other villages which McCabe visited but there were one or two important ones, notably, besides Lalbura's, those of Poiboi [Pawibawia], and Bungteva [Buangtheuva] which showed signs of recalcitrance. Matters came to a head in February 1892, when McCabe ordered Lalbura to supply 100 coolies. Lalbura refused and McCabe decided to visit the village. Towards the end of February he started for Lalbura and at his first stage on the journey he found Lalbura's men engaged in burning his camp at the Sonai. He reached Lalbura on the 29th February. Mr. McCabe had an unpleasant experience here. Some 300 Lushais were seen advancing towards the village. Mr. McCabe ordered Lieutenant Tytler to fire a volley which held up the enemy temporarily. But before satisfactory dispositions could be taken up to guard against attacks from every quarter the Lushais started to fire the houses. Mr. McCabe's party, however, managed to get much of their

baggage out, and this was placed in a heap in the open centre of the village. The coolies were told to lie down and take shelter from the bullets behind this. So great was the heat that the brass plates of the sepoy, who lay near the west face of the stockade, became twisted into fantastic shapes. Severe fighting followed, but McCabe established himself in the village without real difficulty, though Poiboi, Bungteya and Langkham [Lainkhama] joined in and aided Lalbura in the repeated attacks which were delivered on McCabe's position between 1st March and 10th April. During this period, on the 4th of April, a party of Lushais from Maite, Poiboi and Lalbura raided Boruncherra Tea Estate in the Hailakandi Subdivision of Cachar district, their object being to divert attention from the Eastern Lushai people, an object of course which was not fulfilled. In this raid 45 persons were killed and 13 carried off into captivity.

It was clear that operations on a big scale would have to be undertaken and a request was made for Military aid. Three hundred men of the 18th Bengal Infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel R. H. F. Rennick, were sent up to Aijal, and they arrived there on the 19th March, releasing the Military Police for operations in the field. McCabe's plan was to keep Aijal strongly protected, to fortify Lalbura as a main base and to make a road from Aijal to the Sonai, so as to maintain his communications with Aijal. This road which was 14 miles in length over difficult country was completed by Mr. Sweet on the 3rd April and McCabe was ready to start on the 10th April. Captain Loch, Commandant of the Military Police, was in command of the column, which consisted of 225 men of the Surma Valley Military Police, under Lieutenant Tytler, Roddy and Johnson, and 75 men of the 18th Bengal Infantry under Lieutenant Edwards. The remainder of the 18th Regiment under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Rennick garrisoned the fort at Aijal throughout the operations and gave great assistance in supplying food and reinforcements from the base. On the 14th April Poiboi was captured. The attack had been planned for the previous day, but as many coolies of the transport department were suffering from moon-blindness the advance was so delayed that camp had to be made on the banks of the Tuirini,

and the attack postponed. The village was then stormed at dawn after a steep climb of over 2,000 feet. At this time Poiboi's village consisted of 722 houses. On the 7th May, Bungteya was captured. Before the end of May Lalbura was a fugitive and all resistance was at an end. The destruction of Maite at the end of May was the last important event in these operations. On the 8th June the Expedition returned to Aijal. They had had a very strenuous time, fighting and marching under very harsh conditions in inclement weather, but they were completely successful in subduing the resistance of the eastern Lushais and casualties were small, 16 killed and 30 wounded. Fortunately the Western Lushais behaved well throughout this period, having evidently learned their lesson in 1890.

It is interesting to note that in forwarding McCabe's Report to the Government of India in his letter No. 4873-P.,* dated the 23rd October 1892, the Chief Commissioner already had in mind the possibility of the inclusion of the South Lushai Hill in the Assam administration. He was awaiting then McCabe's report on that proposal. Probably the incidents of the expedition had emphasised the inconvenience of having the Southern Lushais under a different administration from the North. In sympathy with the Eastern Lushai rising, for instance, the Howlongs in South Lushai also took up arms, and were dealt with by Captain Shakespear from the South together with a column from Burma. But these forces failed owing to lack of provisions to join hands with McCabe at Bungteya as arranged and McCabe seems to consider that this detracted from the results of his campaign to some extent.

In 1894-95, it came to light that the Chief of Falam within Burma was demanding and receiving tribute from Chiefs within the Lushai Hills, and the Political Officer, North Lushai Hills, issued notices to the effect that Lushai Chiefs were not to meet such demands in the future. Among the Chiefs who had paid to Falam were Kairuma Sailo as well as others even nearer Aijal.

In 1895-96 the Western Lushais gave no trouble, and the

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Asiatic Surveyor, Vol. A, December 1892, Nos. 14, 141.

conditions had improved so much that the Chief Thangula who had been deported in 1891 was allowed to return in July 1895, long before the ten years period, for which he was detained, had expired.

In the Eastern Lushai Country Lalbura submitted, and the Howlongs gave no trouble. But it became necessary to undertake an expedition against Kairuma, the determination of whom, and the other descendants of Vuta, in the east of the district to maintain their independence had been sufficiently evident when Shakespear, Political Officer, South Lushai Hills, and the Political Officer, North, had met at Kairuma's in January 1895. Loch with Lieutenants Wilson of the 44th Gurkha Rifles and Clay of the 43rd Gurkha Rifles, and 300 North Lushai Military Police, co-operated with the South Lushai administration under Shakespear and that of the Chin Hills under Mr. Tuck, and the operations were successfully carried out in December 1895. There was no resistance†.

In reporting the results of the expedition to the Government of India, the Chief Commissioner of Assam observed as follows in his letter No. 321-For.-P.,* dated the 15th June 1896.

"2. The Chief Commissioner considers that the expedition has fully accomplished the objects for which it was organised, viz., the complete subjugation of what is known as Kairuma group of villages. The fact there was no active opposition to our forces is, in Sir William Ward's opinion, due partly to the previous disarmament of the Tashoons by the Falam Column, partly to the excellent arrangements by the Political Officer Mr. Porteous, for the conduct of the expedition, and partly to the cordial co-operation of the three columns from Fort Aijal, from Falam, and from Lungleh. Major Shakespear's brilliant capture of Jakopa and Jaduna had also a marked effect in bringing the Kairuma group to terms.

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4. In addition to the submission of Kairuma, which has been brought about by this expedition the Government of India

† Assam Secretariat, For. A, November 1896, Nos. 13-30.

* Bengal Secretariat, Political, A, November 1896, Nos. 16-17.

will observe from paragraphs 20 and 21 of the report [i.e., Mr. Porteous, Political Officer, North Lushai Hills] that the Eastern Lushai Chiefs (Lalbura), who gave so much trouble in Mr. McCabe's expedition of 1892 against the Eastern Lushais, has also tendered his submission. This Chief had been a fugitive ever since the operations of 1892.

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7. Sir William Ward considers that much credit is due to the Political Officer, North Lushai Hills, for the results which have been attained, and to Major Shakespear and the officers of the Burma Column for the cordial manner in which they co-operated with Mr. Porteous. The Political Officer, in paragraph 26 of his report, brings to the Chief Commissioner's special notice the services of Captain Loch who commanded the whole police force. Captain Loch's connection with the North Lushai Hills Military Police Battalion will shortly cease, and the Chief Commissioner has much pleasure in bringing to the notice of the Government of India the excellent work this officer has done not only in this expedition and in that against the Eastern Lushais in 1892, but also throughout the period of his tenure of the appointment of Commandant of the North Lushai Hills Military Police Battalion during which he has organised that battalion on its present footing, and has also succeeded, in spite of many difficulties, in his efforts to improve the position of the men and to make them a thoroughly efficient and, at the same time, thoroughly contented body."

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In the closing paragraphs of his report No. 85* on these operations dated the 6th May 1896, from Fort Aijai, Mr. Porteous reviewed the position as it then appeared. His conclusions were these.

"25. With the close of the operations against Kairuma it may, I think, be safely prophesied that the long series of Lushai expeditions has now ended, and that no further operations on the scale, which it was thought necessary to adopt against the descendants of Veta, can ever again be necessary. There is not

in the Lushai Hills any unexplored "Hinter-land" such as still exists in the Naga Hills to give possible future trouble, and although the system of Chiefs, all closely related, who are so implicitly obeyed and so complacently looked up to by their subjects, as is the case among the Lushais must for long demand a display of force unnecessary amongst a less intelligent and more disunited race, a substantial reduction in the force required to garrison these hills should certainly in a few years' time be possible.

The immediate results of the expedition have been to break completely the power and prestige of Kairuma, and to dispel effectually the idea that any Lushai Chief, by reason of his supposed inaccessibility from Aijal, can safely ignore the orders of the Political Officer. The facility with which columns from Falam and Lungleh can co-operate with a force from the North Lushai Hills has also been demonstrated, and any lingering idea that the assistance of the Tashon Chief from Falam may be counted upon by a refractory Lushai Chief has been dissipated.

26. It remains for me to acknowledge the effective assistances received from Major Shakespear on the one hand, and from Mr Tuck and Captain Whiffin on the other, with their respective columns. To the previous disarmament of the Tashons in particular, I chiefly attribute the entire collapse of Kairuma's threatened resistance.

With the Aijal Column, I am pleased to record that the officers, one and all, worked zealously and cheerfully. I wish however, to bring specially to the notice of the Chief Commissioner the services of Captain Loch as the officer in chief executive command of the whole force. To his untiring personal efforts and excellent organization of the transport and supply services it is mainly due that in the incessant movements of detachments and convoys there was no hitch of any sort from beginning to end of the operations, while the discipline and marching of the sepoy was all that could be desired, and showed the high state of the efficiency to which Captain Loch has brought his battalion. Mr. Anley made an excellent transport officer, and did good service afterwards in dealing

with three of the Chiefs to whose villages I sent him. I desire to draw special attention to his services."

In reporting on the history of the year 1896-97, Mr. Porteous was able to observe, "I leave the district with practically all the Chiefs reconciled to Government, and with I believe, not the least likelihood of any future disturbance of the peace... Lalbura received me in his village in March like any other Chief, while Kairuma met me outside his village, no sepoy, however, being present."

The same Report makes reference to the labours of Messrs. Savidge and Lorrain, the pioneer Missionaries who had been in these hills since the spring of 1893 and had been wonderfully successful in introducing education. In the Report for the following year, 1897-98, the last for the North Lushai Hills as a separate administrative unit, it is stated as proof of the peacefulness of the district that while on tour no officer had more than 4 rifles for an escort.

V. The South Lushai Hills District—As early as 12th January 1890, the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, Mr. D. R. Lyall, I.C.S., sent up proposals* for the administration of these Hills to the Bengal Government on the assumption that it was "the intention of the Government of India to completely dominate the country between this and Burmah." A note which he prepared on the subject recommends that "for the present the system of Government through Chiefs should be fully recognised." He drew up (paragraph 5 of his note) a set of orders which he considered should be issued to the Chiefs. These were as follows :

I. "All raids absolutely prohibited. Any chief raiding, to have his village destroyed by the paramount power, and the offending chief to be liable to death.

I put in this last clause advisedly. At present human life, except that of a chief, is of the very smallest value, and one of the most necessary lessons is to teach these men that it has a value. This can best be done by taking the only life that at

Assam Secretariat, For., A, July 1896, Nos. 7-41.

* *Assam Secretariat, Political and Judicial, A, Foreign Progs. August 1890, Nos. 47-77.*

present has any value. In the long run this will be found the kindest way, and, as the chiefs value their own lives, it will also be found the most effectual, but it must be no idle threat, and the first raiding Chief must be executed in the most public way possible.

II. Absolute security of person and property and free access into every village must be insisted on from the first. By this I mean security of persons and property as between village and village and between the people of the country and ourselves. The chiefs must be made to understand that a single frontier policeman, dak-runner, or a telegraph official must be as safe as the European Superintendent. Free access into every village must also be insisted on.

The present is the time to insist on these terms under severe penalties. If life is taken, it should be life for life, and if access is refused or a traveller robbed, severe fines should be imposed.

III. Each village and chief should be responsible for the maintaining, improving, and, if so ordered, the making of such roads round his village as the Superintendent may order him to maintain. The labour should be paid for at a low rate, thus enabling the men to pay their tax, as proposed hereafter. It is absolutely necessary, in order to control the people, that there should be a route fit for mules and coolies to every village...

The Superintendent should have power of fining any chief not keeping up his roads, and of compelling him and his people to do the work by force.

IV. Each chief should be made responsible for the collection and payment of the tax of his village. This should be in the form of a poll-tax both as being most easily imposed and as affording information regarding the number of his followers. It has been found best in the Naga Hills to insist on payment of taxation from the first. The payment should at first be not much more than the amount each village can earn by road-making, and the Superintendent should distribute the roads, so far as possible, in proportion to the size of the villages.

V. There should be a meeting of the chiefs each year at

the central post, and attendance at this should as far as possible be compulsory, as evidence of their acknowledgment of sovereignty, and absence should be punished by fine.


I lay stress on this so long as the Government is merely personal, and at this meeting the Superintendent should decide all disputes between chief and villages, the chiefs being instructed that the Superintendent is to be the final arbitrator of all disputes which they fail to settle amicably among themselves, and that they are not to be decided by force. Chiefs will, of course, have it open to them to bring forward grievances at any time, and so far as possible the Superintendent should decide them promptly ; but there are some regarding which he would wish to consult the other chiefs, and all such disputes should be decided at this meeting. In the first days of the Hill Tracts as a district, Captain Lewin, who knew the people better than any British officer has done since, recommended a similar gathering for his district in the following words (paragraph 23 of his No. 532, dated 1st July 1872) :—

“I recommend that once a year there be held at Rangamati a mela or gathering at which every Chief, Roaja, Dewan, or other headman be ordered to attend to meet the Commissioner of the Division and pay their respects. The chiefs should on this occasion publicly lay before the Commissioner such part of their revenue payment as may be due at that time to Government. On this occasion also all appointments of headmen might be publicly made or confirmed. By this meeting the headmen would be once a year at least brought into direct personal communication with the head of the district, whereas at present there exist hundreds of them whom I have never seen. This would also be a valuable opportunity for ascertaining the popular feeling upon any subject, as well as for obtaining information as to what goes on in remote parts of the district”.

If such a mela was advisable in the Hill Tracts, it is absolutely necessary in the new country...”

7. In all other matters he advised that the present administration by chiefs be absolutely left as it is, and that we should not interfere with the village administration of criminal, civil, and social matters, but confine the administration, at least for

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the present, to preserving the public peace, leaving internal matters to the Chiefs.

Mr. Lyall's proposal visualised the whole of the present Lushai Hills District being placed under Bengal, but this was subsequently modified to a horizontal division of the country between Bengal and Assam.

Discussions as to the future administration of the country went on during the year 1890-91, and a reference to the Northern boundary of the South Lushai Hills is found in paragraph 6 of the Bengal Government's letter No. 1619-P*, dated the 19th April 1890 where it is stated that it might be safely assumed that it would be to the south of the country "occupied by the descendants of Lullal". This boundary was accepted by the Government of India in their letter No. 1396-E*, dated the 3rd July 1890.

Definite proposals were next submitted to the Government of India in Bengal letter No. 449-P.D.,† dated the 6th November 1890 as follows.

"With reference to my predecessor's letter No. 1628-P., of the 19th April last, I am directed to submit, for the consideration and orders of the Government of India, the following proposals made by the Commissioner of Chittagong for the administration of the Lushai country under this Government.

2. Mr. Lyall proposes—

(1) That the Lushai country under the control of the Bengal Government should not be amalgamated with the Chittagong Hill Tracts, but that it should be constituted a separate charge under a special officer.

(2) That a post of Superintendent or Political Officer for the Lushai country, on salary of Rs. 800 to Rs. 1,000 a month, should be created.

(3) That the appointment of Superintendent should be conferred on Mr. C. S. Murray, Assistant Political Officer, Lushai Expeditionary Force.

(4) That the Chittagong Hill Tracts Frontier Police should

*Bengal Secretariat, Political, A April 1891, Nos. 1-38, File No. L-10.

†Bengal Secretariat, Pol., A, April 1891, Nos. 1-38, File No. L/10

be transferred to the Lushai country, and the Civil Police of the district, which would now man the Hill Tracts, should be increased.

(5) That Mr. R. F. H. Pughe, District Superintendent of Police, now in charge of the Frontier Force in Fort Lungleh, should be appointed commandant of the force in the new district.

3. The Lieutenant-Governor is of opinion that for the reasons mentioned in paragraph 5 of Mr. Lyall's letter of the 12th January last, the Lushai tracts should not be amalgamated with the Hill Tracts, but should be dealt with politically under a special officer. He would suggest, therefore, the appointment of a Superintendent of these tracts on a salary of Rs. 700 to Rs. 1,000 with a fixed travelling allowance of Rs. 150 a month, and if the Government of India sanctions the appointment, would appoint Mr. Murray to the post in consideration of the good work done by him during the last two expeditions...

II. I am to add that the Lieutenant-Governor begs permission during the present cold season, and until the above arrangements come into force, to retain the services of Captain Shakespear as Assistant Political Officer as at present, as the work to be done during this period, according to Mr. Lyall's programme, will require two officers..."

The Government of India in their letter No. 2641-E*, dated the 24th December 1890 agreed that the Lushai country should be formed into a separate charge and that the Chittagong Hill Tracts Frontier Police should be transferred to the Lushai country, leaving other points for further consideration.

Proposals of the future administration of the district in their final form were, after consultation with the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal Sir Charles Elliott, submitted by the Commissioner of Chittagong Mr. D. R. Lyall, in his letter No. 133-H.T.,† dated the 28th February 1891. The main features of proposals were as follows. The principal officer were to be Superintendent in general control, a Commandant of Police with 4 Assistants, a

* Bengal Secretariat, Pol., A April 1891, Nos. 1-38, File No. L/10.

† Bengal Secretariat, Pol. A., April 1891, Nos. 1-13, File No. L/27.

European Medical Officer, and a native District Engineer. The Headquarters were for the present to be Fort Tregear, though Lungleh was regarded as the most convenient location, at any rate for police headquarters. Taxation was to be imposed, and the rates were based on rates proposed by Mr. McCabe in the light of his experience of the Naga Hills, *i.e.*, at Re. 1 house-tax, 10 seers of rice per house at the rate of Rs. 2 per maund, and 6 days' free labour a year : labour above 6 days to be paid for.

The duties of the Superintendent are enumerated in a set of rules attached to Mr. Lyall's letter of which the most important run as follows.

"I. The Superintendent will be over all departments and will correspond with the Commissioner of Chittagong.

II. His duties are to settle all disputes between chief and chief village and village, and tribe and tribe, and to prevent all raiding and public breaches of the peace. He will not interfere in the administration of each village by its own chief unless in very exceptional cases when called on to interfere by either the chief or the villagers, and then only on strong grounds being shown, and he will report all such cases to the Commissioner.

III. The Superintendent will not interfere with the ordinary internal administration of the police, but he is the head of the police, as of all other departments, and all correspondence from the office of the Commandant will pass through him. He has power to issue orders on the Commandant in all matters*, and his orders must be carried out."

Mr. Lyall also had something to say about the need for opening up communication with Burma from Chittagong, a subject that has become of increasing interest in more recent years. He wrote as follows.

"7. This subject has not been touched this year, though it is, in my opinion, the most important point in connection with the new country. Mandalay is only some 250 miles as the crow flies from Chittagong, and Chittagong will be within 20 to 22 hours journey from Calcutta when the railway is made. [It was completed in 1896.] If, then, a feasible line for a cart road or

* Bengal Secretariat, Pol., A, April 1891, Nos. 1-13.

a railway can be discovered from Chittagong to Mandalay, the land route to Upper Burma will enable the surplus population of Bengal, who refuse to cross the sea, to spread into Upper Burma, benefiting both provinces. The trade of Upper Burma will also gain much by the possibility of easy communication between Calcutta and Mandalay...

The difficulties are great but not, I think, insurmountable, while the gain would be enormous."

These proposals were forwarded to the Government of India with Bengal's letter No. 1049-P.,* dated the 16th March 1891. Discussing boundaries, it was stated that it had been agreed that, as between Bengal and Assam, "the boundary on the north should follow on the whole the tribal division between the descendants of Lalul and their southern neighbours." The Lieutenant-Governor agreed as to their being one head of the district in control of all departments and had already sanctioned the rules quoted above. As to location, His Honour had decided to post both the Superintendent and the Commandant of the Police at Lungleh, in order to shorten the route taken by supplies. The rate of tax proposed was approved: The Lieutenant-Governor's comment being that the payment of rice rather than cash should be encouraged,

The Government of India sanctioned these proposals in their letter No. 1104-E.,† dated the 27th May 1891 and subsequently intimated the sanction of the Secretary of State in their letter No. 2408-E.‡ dated the 12th December 1891. In forwarding their views to the Secretary of State, the Government of India in their Financial Despatch No. 191, dated the 14th July 1891 stated their view that "it is probable that ultimately it may be found possible and desirable to consolidate under one administration the whole or the greater part of the territory in the occupation of the various tribes now separately controlled from Bengal, Burma and Assam."

* Bengal Secretariat, Pol., A, April 1891, Nos. 1-13.

† Bengal Secretariat, Pol., A, December 1891, Nos. 63-96 File No.

1/22.

Bengal Secretariat, Pol., A, January 1892, Nos. 63-64, File No.

1/22.

Meanwhile, in anticipation of the Government of India's and the Secretary of State's sanction, the new district had been constituted as from April 1st 1891 with Mr. Murray as the first Superintendent. Between the time when the operations of 1889-90 terminated and this date, there was evidently, judging from the Commissioner's letter* No. 231-H.T., dated the 22nd February 1891, which purports to be "a report on the work done in the Southern Lushai Hills since the departure of General Tregear and the bulk of his force in May 1890", no attempt at setting up a system of administration. Officers were engaged on separate operations in different directions, in improving communications and in difficult transport work ; the later especially being a major problem which bulks largely in all the correspondence. Apparently Mr. C. S. Murray of the Police was posted in these Hills as Assistant Police Officer, possibly under the Deputy Commissioner of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, while Captain J. Shakespear was also serving in the area, with a similar status. The Frontier Police were partly with Murray at Lungleh and partly in the Hill Tracts under Mr. Ryland and the Deputy Commissioner.

But Mr. Murray was not to hold the position for long. Though in the previous November they had recommended that he should be the Superintendent of the new district, Government had, after the unfortunate incident at Jacapa's [Zakapa] to advise that he should be returned to the Police. The matter is dealt with in Bengal's letter No. X † dated the 27th March 1891 to the Government of India which ran as follows :

"Lieutenant-Governor desires me to apply to the Government of India for the service of Captain J. Shakespear, District Staff Officer of the Leinster Regiment to fill the appointment of Superintendent, South Lushai Hills District.

His Honour has had before him the full account of Mr. Murray's proceedings which ended on the 10th of February in the outbreak in Jacapa's village and the death of two sepoys and a naik of the Frontier Police, two army signallers, and a private

* Bengal Secretariat. Pol., A, April 1891 File No. L/27. Nos. 1-13.

† Bengal Secretariat, A, April 1891; Nos. 1-38, File No. L/19

servant of one of the officers, and is constrained to say that they show such want of political sagacity, of judgment and of foresight as to lead to the conclusion that, however successful he has been in subordinate posts, Mr. Murray is not fit to hold the important and almost independent position of Superintendent of the South Lushai District. In spite of the distinguished service which Mr. Murray had previously rendered when under the guidance of such officers as Mr. Lyall and Colonel Tregear, Sir Charles Elliott is convinced that it is for the public interest that that officer should return to his ordinary duties in the Bengal Civil Police. Captain Shakespear has, in the capacity as Assistant Political Officer in these Hill Tracts, earned much distinction and evinced the possession of qualities which lead to a confident belief that he will do well in the position in which the Lieutenant-Governor proposes to place him."

The Government of India and the Secretary of State agreed to Captain Shakespear's being thus employed and he took over charge from Mr. Murray on the 16th April 1891. He was to remain in the Lushai Hills for some 14 years, first in the Southern area and then as Superintendent of the combined Lushai Hills district.

The first task that Shakespear had to carry out was the punishment of Jakopa who had defeated Murray a few months before. He was completely successful, Jakopa fled, and the Mollienpui tribe were finally subjugated.

His first report as Superintendent is for the year 1890-91 and is dated the 14th July 1891, but, since it refers to a period when, as he explains, he was not in charge of the district, but merely Assistant Political Officer, it is not a very informative document. He reported the country as having been quiet. It was garrisoned by 200 of the 2/2nd Gurkhas based on Tregear and 170 Frontier Police based on Lungleh.

His second* report for 1891-92 which contains much valuable material, is embodied in a report written by the Commissioner. Mr. W. B. Oldham, himself, who explains that this method had to be adopted "as Captain Shakespear was

necessarily ignorant of much that was done for and in his charge". A durbar of chiefs was held on 1st to 4th January 1892 at a spot about 2 miles from Lungleh, and it was attended by representatives from every tribe. Shakespear addressed them on the subject of the permanency of our occupation and the punishment they would suffer if they, carried on feuds with each other. They were made to swear friendship or at least peace with each other, and Mr. Oldham points out that, of those who thus swore amity, the only one concerned in the subsequent troubles was the petty chief Morpunga [Hmawng-phunga] (of the Howlong clan). Five clans were represented. Howlong, Thangloa, Mollienpui, Lakher or Longshen, and Poi.

As regards revenue, Shakespear claimed that the principle of paying tribute in rice had been generally accepted. The question of enforced labour is discussed in paragraph 10 of the report. Shakespear considered that the labour should be paid, and suggested 4 annas a day. The Commissioner considered it should be 8 annas (paragraph 11).

Shakespear succeeded in effecting a meeting on 30th January 1892 with Mr. McCabe, the Superintendent of the North Lushai Hills at Kairuma's village : and they settled between them the details of the boundary line between the two districts. It appears that Captain Shakespear then went towards the south to the village of Dokola [Dokulha], a Poi Chief, brother of Haosata, for on 20th of February 1892 he recorded a statement by Chief Dokola when the latter was being charged with murder, which reads as follows :—

"Thongliena's men shot my brother Vantura. If did not kill some men my brother's spirit would have no slaves in the "Head men's village" [sic, probably should be "Dead Men's village (Mithi Khua)], therefore I went to shoot two men of Thongliena's village. We met some men of Boite Thilkara's village and mistook them for Thongliena's men and so shot at them". The capture of this Chief Dokola was effected on the 15th February 1892 by Mr. R. Sneyd Hutchinson in the following circumstances. On February 17th he and his party, consisting of a Subadar and 36 men, had camped late at night.

after an arduous march through thick bamboo jungle along the Kolodyne, fording and refording the river and often missing their path.

At 3 A. M. a start was made and Mr. Hutchinson's account reads as follows :—

"We reached old *jhamu* in about an hour and then struck down a path into some of this year's *jhamu*. Two houses were heavily laden with *shaw* but nobody was about. We then went through high tree jungle up to the top of a hill. While ascending I heard a cock crowing so knew we were near our goal and advanced with great caution. On topping the summit I saw the village with light of fires in the houses lying below me ; we moved rapidly down the side but were observed just nearing the north village and a yell was given. I charged into the village with some 15 men who were near me : men with guns came tumbling out of the houses and I heard shots fired. I had ordered my men not to fire but to follow me in a rush on the Chief's house, the situation of which I knew. Unfortunately a man with a gun took deliberate point blank aim at me and I fired at him with my pistol, he lurched forward dropping the gun but was seized and carried off by some other men near him, the gun remaining with me. The delay of a minute or so just stopped me from getting Dokola who made away as I entered the house in company with some other men."

Mr. Hutchinson did not know that it was the Chief Dokola he saw disappearing, but learned this later. His force was too small to risk engaging the enemy in thick jungle so he remained in the village. It was here ~~that~~ on searching, Mr. Hutchinson found a knife and a prismatic compass belonging to Lieutenant Stewart, also a brown leather shoe and some empty revolver cartridge cases. Mr. Hutchinson used the captives he had made as a bargaining counter for the production, unconditionally of Dokola and after much procrastination Dokola came in on the evening of the 18th of February.

Laban's chief of February 1892 in the Northern district had no effect in the Southern district. News of the attack on ~~Laban~~ on 2nd March reached Shakspear on the 5th and he ~~at once~~ prepared to start for the North, with 3 British Officers

and 150 rifles of the Frontier Police. Shakespear undertook this operation without being asked and though the Commission decided later his action had been precipitate, yet both the Assam Administration and Mr. McCabe welcomed his advance to the North as a diversion which might prevent the Southern Howlongs from joining the tribes who were fighting McCabe. Though Shakespear was able to get no further than Vansanga's village, he succeeded in keeping a number of chiefs fully employed. The opposition he encountered was considerable and he had eventually to decide that his force was too small to quell the rebellion completely and to return to Lungleh towards the end of March, leaving a force under Mr. Daly to garrison Vansanga's village. Reinforcements were sent both troops and police from Dacca, but the situation continued dangerous for some time. Vansanga was constantly attacked, Lungleh itself and Demagiri were threatened, telegraph wires were cut, communications interfered with, while Shakespear had great difficulty in preventing the friendly chiefs from joining the rebels, but all opposition came to an end with the arrival of a column from Burma. This Burma, or Nwengal column, as it was called, was originally designed to assist McCabe by demonstrating in the neighbourhood of the disturbed area. They had, however, for some reason been recalled to Fort White so as to be there on 10th April. But on receipt of the Lieutenant-Governor's request for help it at once started out again and after a most arduous march in unknown country at a very trying season, effected a junction with Shakespear at Daokoma's village on 3rd May. They were about 350 strong. The combined forces effected as much punishment as they could between 4th and 9th May, which, owing to want of provisions occasioned by difficulties of transport, was all the time they could spare, about 1,500 houses being burnt. The column then continued to Lungleh and Chittagong and so back to Rangoon.

Climatic conditions in the country were bad and sickness among the men employed was very great. In paragraph 18*

* Bengal Secretariat, Pol., A, November 1892, Nos. 30-34.

of the Commissioner's letter, he says that out of 409 ranks of the 3rd Bengal Infantry, 267 including 1 British Officer, were sent away invalided, and of them many died : of 74 men of the Dacca Special Police Reserve all but 6 were invalided and some died : of 408 Military Police over 100 were invalided including 2 British Officers.

Fort Tregear was destroyed by fire on 5th January 1892 and Mr. Apothecary Antonio was burned to death,

In commenting on the results of these operations, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, in his letter No. 601-P.D.† dated the 3rd October 1892, described them as far from decisive and gave his opinion that it would be necessary to organise a combined military expedition from North to South and from Burma as well "in order to thoroughly subdue these warlike and enterprising savages".

It was thus that at the urgent request of the Bengal Government the Government of India sanctioned reluctantly, in the Viceroy's telegram No. 38-C,‡ dated the 7th November 1892, further operations in the cold weather of 1892-93, and agreed to furnish a force of 400 Gurkhas and 2 guns. These operations were undertaken between December 1892 and February 1893, and resulted in the submission of all the villages concerned. They were carried out in consultation with Mr. A. W. Davis, Political Officer of the North Lushai Hills, who co-operated in occupying the village of Lalrhima. Five hundred and fifty troops were employed and about 400 Military Police. There was no organised opposition, the fines imposed were easily collected and about 500 guns were surrendered. The expedition and its results were summarised as follows in the Bengal Government's report No. I.P.T.,* dated the 31st July 1893.

"...in order to protect friendly villages, our convoys and communications, and to impress on the native tribes once for all a sense of British supremacy, a punitive expedition, consisting

† Bengal Secretariat, Pol., A, April 1893, Nos. 27-197. File L/28 of 1892.

‡ Bengal Secretariat, Political, A, April 1893, Nos. 27-197.

* Bengal Secretariat, Political, A, August 1893, Nos. 4-6, File L/49 of 1893.

of 400 Gurkhas, two Mounted [sic] Battery guns and 150 rifles of the XVIth Bengal Infantry under command of Major Pulley, was despatched to Chittagong in December last. This force, acting in concert with a force from Fort Aijal, completely effected its object, and without meeting any resistance established the authority of Government throughout the whole tract of country where it had been resisted and returned to India in February. Captain Shakespear summarises the result of the expedition in the following words : "The general condition of the country now, and the success we have attained in the payment of revenue and fines, seem to point to the fact that the Lushais have abandoned all idea of combined resistance, although it is quite possible that isolated outbreaks, such as that at Jacopa's, may, under similar circumstances occur for several years to come, but the force of the police on the spot, if maintained at its present strength, should be sufficient for the suppression of such disturbances." An outpost has been established at Lalrhima in the heart of the Lushai country on the boundary line between the North and South Lushai territory, and the small force stationed there, together with the disarmament of hostile Chiefs will, it is believed, render it almost impossible for any serious trouble to again arise."

In the following year *i.e.*, 1893-94, Shakespear reported the capture of an important person and a bitter enemy of the British in the shape of Ropuilieni, mother of Lalthuama, widow of Vandula, an old enemy of the British, and daughter of Vonolel, the chief against whom the Cachar Column was directed in 1871-72. She was evidently a focus of discontent and her capture led to the surrender of her son and another man, Loncheyva, who was wanted for murder. The woman and her son were dealt with under Regulation III and confined in Chittagong Jail,, where Ropuilieni died of old age in January 1895. Another capture which had a good effect in pacifying the country was that of Vanchanga or Vansanga, made personally by Mr. C. W. C. Plowden of the Military Police. Vansanga had been troublesome in 1892 and as long as he was at large he kept up the spirit of hostility among the Lushais. In his report for this year, 1893-94, Captain Shakespear reviews the three

years in which he had been in charge of the District since April 1891. At that time only 20 villages in the whole District had ever been visited by our Officers; the subject of tribute had not been broached; the buildings at Lungleh were mere hovels; between Demagiri and Lungleh there were no Rest Houses; the Military Police were disorganised and badly equipped; the whole clerical staff of the District only numbered two men; and the utmost confusion prevailed everywhere. He was able to claim, that in three years this confusion had been cleared up and that the machinery of the District was in working order.

In August 1893, the Government of India sanctioned the permanent transfer to the civil authorities of 2 150-lb mountain guns (7 pounder) which were retained at Lungleh.

On September 6th 1895 by their Proclamation No. 1697-E., the Government of India declared the South Lushai Hills to be included in the Lower Provinces of Bengal, a position which they had in fact if not in law, occupied since 1891.

In December 1895 operations were commenced against the villages of Kairuma and Jaduna, in consultation with Porteous, the Political Officer and Loch, the Commandant of the Military Police, of the North Lushai Hills. Shakespear started on the 17th December 1895, reached Jaduna's village on the 24th December and he and the forces from Aijal and Burma, the latter under Mr. Tuck, met at Kairuma's on the 25th. There was no resistance, the necessary punishment was imposed without any trouble and Jaduna himself was captured on the 4th January 1896. Jacopa who had for long evaded capture was also run to earth on the 1st January 1896 in this expedition, Shakespear's last in the south.

The report for 1895-96* being Shakespear's last, as he was under orders to leave the District for the North Lushai Hills, he took the opportunity to set down his view as to future policy. He expressed the firm conviction that throughout the District all ideas of resistance had been definitely abandoned and it had been generally accepted that tribute must be paid

* Report on the Administration of the South Lushai Hills for 1895-96. In Bengal Government GAZETTE, A, NEW 1896, Nos. 17-21.

and coolies must be supplied whether for transport or for building. The "rough coercive measures" of the past could now safely be changed for more gentle ones, though he still held that any chief who disobeyed orders would have to be severely dealt with. He mentions as a certainty that with peaceful conditions the villages would gradually break up into small hamlets, a tendency which would render it more difficult to recover tribute and to collect labour as it would make it harder for the Chiefs to enforce their orders. As a remedy for this, his view was that certain Chiefs should be appointed as Heads of Circles, being paid at certain moderate rates per month. They would be responsible for tribute and labour for all hamlets in their Circle and for the disposal of all complaints. In this system Shakespear saw a way out of many difficulties which lay ahead.

In forwarding this report to the Government of Bengal with his letter No. 239-L.,† dated the 20th March 1896, Mr. W. B. Oldham, the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division who had worked with Shakespear for several years, wrote as follows.

"...The full accomplishment of all he has striven for is a fitting crown to Major Shakespear's work and efforts in the South Lushai Hills during the five years for which he has administered them. This last report of his will have to be carefully studied by his successor, as it either lays down, or refers to, the lines in all matters of chief importance on which the administration should proceed and progress, and desirable developments should be sought for. Major Shakespear is making over his charge not only wholly pacified, but thoroughly examined and accurately known and ready for the gradual application of the internal territorial system, which alone can be a permanent basis for its future administration."

The Lieutenant-Governor* added his encomium when forwarding the report to the Government of India in these terms.

"7. Sir Alexander Mackenzie entirely concurs in the high praise which is bestowed by Mr. Oldham on Major Shakespear's administration of these hills, and is glad also to recognise the value of his final report, which deals thoroughly

† Bengal, Political, A, May 1896, Nos. 17-21.

* Bengal, Political, A, May 1896, Nos. 17-21.

and clearly with all matters of importance. It must be added that to Mr. Oldham's advice and counsel much of Major Shakespear's success is due. It is a serious loss to Government that both these officers should be simultaneously transferred from a division where they have laboured in co-operation for several years, during which time the country has not only been pacified, but British rule has been firmly established and the lines of future administration finally laid down. In effecting these results, the work of Major Shakespear's Assistants, Messrs. Sneyd Hutchinson, Williamson and Drake-Brockman, deserves also to be acknowledged."

In writing to him on the 16th† January 1896, on his going on leave, the Chief Secretary of Bengal, Mr. (afterwards Sir Henry and Chief Commissioner of Assam) H. J. S. Cotton, said, "You will have the satisfaction of leaving a thoroughly quiet country to your successor, and will know that however trying your work has been during the past five years, it has not been in vain."

Mr. R. H. Sneyd Hutchinson of the Indian Police succeeded Major Shakespear, and was the last Superintendent of the South Lushai Hills. Very little of importance occurred in 1896-97 except that two important wanted men submitted voluntarily, Kaplehya [Kaphleia] son of Jaduna [Zaduna], and Kairuma, who gave himself up to Porteous of the North Lushai Hills.

VI. The amalgamation of the North and South Lushai Hills into the Lushai Hills District—This had long been the subject of discussion. On 29th January 1892, a conference was held at Calcutta, subsequently known as the "Chin Lushai Conference," at the instance of the Governor General, "to discuss civil and military affairs connected with the control of the Lashai and Chin Hills" (letter no. 248-B,* dated the 21st January 1892 from Government of India, Military Department) at which the following officers were present—

Sir Charles Elliott, Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal ;
Lieutenant-General Sir J. C. Dormer, Commander-in-Chief,
Mizoram ;

Bengal, Political, A, January 1896, Nos. 120-121.

Bengal Secretariat, Political, A, April 1892, Nos. 55-60, File L/36.

Sir Alexander Mackenzie, Chief Commissioner of Burma ;

Mr. W. E. Ward, Chief Commissioner of Assam ;

Sir Mortimer Durand, Foreign Secretary, Government of India ;

Major-General E. H. H. Collen, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department ;

Major-General Sir James Browne, Quartermaster-General.

The following is an extract from a Resolution which the Government of India recorded on the proceedings of this Conference on the 25th July 1892 (No. 1383-E.)†.

“Resolution—In January last a Conference met at Calcutta to examine certain questions relating to the country of the Lushai and Chin tribes. The Governor-General in Council has now considered the report of the Conference, and is in a position to pass orders upon the main points involved.

2. The territory referred to is at present under three distinct civil administrations and three distinct military commands. The northern Lushais are under the Chief Commissioner of Assam and the General Officer Commanding the Assam district, the southern Lushais are under the Bengal Government and the General Officer Commanding the Presidency district, and the Chins are under the Chief Commissioner of Burma and the General Officer Commanding in that province. It has been recognised for some time past, both by the Government of India by Her Majesty's Secretary of State, that this tripartite division of authority is open to objections, and the main question laid before the Conference was what remedies would be practicable.

3. The final recommendations of the Conference are stated in these words :—

“The majority of the Conference are of opinion that it is very desirable that the whole tract of country known as the Chin-Lushai Hills should be brought under one administrative head as soon as this can be done. They also consider it advisable that the new administration should be subordinate to the Chief Commissioner of Assam....

The Conference is agreed that North and South Lushai, with such portions of the Aracan Hill Tracts as may hereafter be

† Bengal Secretariat, Political, A, October 1892, Nos. 87-95.

determined, should be placed under Assam at once on condition that—

- (1) complete transport and commissariat equipment for supplies from Chittagong to South Lushai, and from Cachar to North Lushai are provided ;
- (2) Funds are granted for roads and telegraphs from Aijal to Lungieh."

4. The conclusions at which the Governor-General in Council has arrived in respect of the proposal of the Conference are as follows :—

(1) The whole of the Lushai country should be under the Chief Commissioner of Assam, and the transfer of the Southern Lushais from Bengal to Assam should be made as early as possible....

* * * *

(4) The Northern Arakan Hill Tracts should be transferred from Burma to Assam"....

Some four years, however, were to pass before the Government of India again reviewed the situation—greatly improved in both North and South Lushai as well as in the Chin Hills—in their letter No. 1564-E. B., dated the 8th September 1896*. They stated that everything seemed to point to the arrival of a period when very substantial reductions in expenditure and establishment might safely be undertaken, and suggested the holding of a conference of Superintendents of the 3 tracts. This took place between 14th and 18th December 1896 at Lungieh and was attended by—

Mr. A. Porteous, I.C.S., Political Officer,

Northern Lushai Hills ;

Mr. R. Sneyd Hutchinson, Bengal Police, Superintendent,

South Lushai Hills ;

Mr. H. N. Tuck, Burma Commission, Political Officer,

Chin Hills ;

Captain G. H. Loch, I.C.S., Commandant,

North Lushai Military Police.

They discussed and made recommendations on a large number of important subjects. As regards the amalgamation of the

North and South Hills Districts, they were all agreed that on both political and financial grounds the transfer of the South Lushai Hills to Assam was eminently desirable, and that it might effect an annual saving of 2 lakhs of rupees.

Incidentally, it should be observed that the Government of Bengal decided in February 1897 to abandon Fort Tregear, a course which the Chin-Lushai Conference also advised,

The Project took final form when, in his letter No. 149-P.,† dated the 17th July 1897, the Chief Commissioner submitted to the Government of India his proposals for the future administration of the Lushai Hills. (The transfer of the South Lushai Hills to Assam was then intended to take place on the 1st October 1897, but this date was to be put back by 6 months). The salient points of this letter are given in the extracts below.

...2. The first step to be taken must be the formal transfer of the South Lushai Hills from the Government of Bengal to the Administration of Assam with effect from 1st October next. The whole of the Lushai Hills will then constitute one area, which will be placed under the immediate control of the Political Officer of the North Lushai Hills, to whom, as subsequently explained in this letter, it is proposed to give the designation of Superintendent of the Lushai Hills. I am to enclose herewith a draft notification of transfer for the approval of the Government of India....

* * * * *

5. The station of Demagiri is not situated within the present area of the South Lushai Hills. It is topographically within the area of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. But, under Sir Charles Elliott's orders, passed in 1892, it was declared that, for administrative purposes, Demagiri should be considered to be part and parcel of the South Lushai Hills, and the Chief Commissioner considers it absolutely essential for the future administration of this tract under Assam, that Sir Charles Elliott's arrangement should be continued after the transfer of the South Lushai Hills has been carried out ...

6. Mr. Cotton accepts Sir William Ward's views as to the present legal position of the Lushai Hills....but he does not

† Assam Secretariat, Foreign, A, August 1897, Nos. 26-42.

concur in the opinion therein expressed, that only the adjective law should be barred in the Lushai Hills, and that the substantive law in force in other parts of British India should be allowed to remain in operation there. Sir Alexander Mackenzie observed that in his opinion it was desirable to have as small a number of enactments as possible in force in the Lushai Hills, that very few of the Acts enumerated in list (i) annexed to my letter of the 26th June 1896, were really necessary, and that the rules framed for the administration of the Hills, supplemented by the Executive action of the Officer in-charge, should generally suffice. The Lieutenant-Governor commended this question for the reconsideration of the Chief Commissioner, and Mr. Cotton, who had already given the matter his careful attention, has had no hesitation in entirely accepting Sir Alexander Mackenzie's views. It has always been maintained in Bengal that the less substantive law there is in force among the Frontier tribes the better. This principle has been steadily maintained in the Chittagong Hill Tracts to the great advantage of the Hill people, and Major Shakespear who has had long experience of the Bengal system and was consulted by the Chief Commissioner on the question now under discussion, has expressed his approval of it. In these circumstances, I am to recommend for the sanction of the Government of India that the whole of the substantive as well as the adjective law which is held to be in force in the Lushai Hills *proprio vigore* with the exception of the Indian Penal Code, may be barred under the provisions of section 2 of Regulation II of 1880, in that tract ...

9. With reference to the rules for the administration of the country which it is proposed to issue under section 6 of Act XIV of 1874, I am directed to say that Mr. Cotton has carefully considered the rules drafted by Mr. Porteous which were accepted by Sir William Ward. These draft rules were based on those in force in the Naga Hills, but Mr. Cotton ascertained from the late Mr. McCabe that they are practically unworkable in those hills; and, although he is not prepared without further consideration to recommend their modification where they are already in force, he could not agree to their application to the Lushai Hills. They are far too elaborate for the purpose aimed at

and involved an amount of interference with the Chiefs which the Chief Commissioner is convinced it would be most inexpedient to exercise. On this subject, Mr. Cotton's attention has been drawn by Major Shakespear to the following remarks recorded by Mr. Davis on the occasion of his making over charge of the North Lushai Hills to Mr. Porteous in 1894 :

"I always held the Chiefs of villages responsible for the behaviour of their people, and upheld their authority to the best of my ability. I have repeatedly told them that this policy will be consistently followed, and that, as long as they behave themselves as they should, their orders will not be interfered with, even though the orders may appear to us at times a little high-handed, and not quite in accord with abstract ideas of justice. In this connection, it is well to remember that no Chief can very greatly misuse his power or oppress his people. Were he to do so, his village, and with it his own importance, would quickly diminish, as the people would migrate to other villages. In upholding the authority of chiefs, I have, as a rule, declined to take up appeals against their orders in petty cases, as it only diminishes a man's authority to be brought into Aijal to answer some petty charge preferred against him by a discontented villager. Besides, any course of action which tends to discourage litigation amongst a people like the Lushais is worth persisting in or they would soon become like the Kukis, in the Naga Hills, who, having been, by neglect on our part, practically emancipated from the control of their hereditary chiefs, are the most litigious tribe in that district."

The Chief Commissioner entirely agrees with these observations, and he is aware that they were fully endorsed by the late Mr. McCabe, and are approved by Major Shakespear. Holding these views, Mr. Cotton placed himself in communication with Mr. McCabe, and he is indebted to the invaluable experience of that lamented officer for the sketch of the draft rules which forms the last Appendix to the letter. It will be seen that they have not been drafted with any attempt at technical precision, and that they aim at simplicity and elasticity,

while at the same time, giving effect, as far as possible, to the procedure, which, either with or without formal sanction, has already established itself in the Lushai Hills. The rules have been sent to Major Shakespear, who reports that they are well suited to the tract for which they are designed and the Chief Commissioner trusts that they may receive the sanction of the Government of India.

10. I am to add that the Chief Commissioner has purposely used the term Superintendent throughout these rules as the designation of the officer in charge of the Lushai Hills. The expression Political Officer is not very appropriate, as his duties are widely different from those of Political Officers employed under the Foreign Department. The term Deputy Commissioner is also not suitable, as it fails to mark the distinction, which should be clear and decisive, between his status and that, for instance, of the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar. The only suitable name appears to be Superintendent, which Mr. Cotton believes is the designation applied to the officer in charge of the similarly situated Shan States. It is proposed, therefore, unless the Government of India should see any objection, to give to the officer in charge of the amalgamated area from the 1st October next the style and designation of Superintendent of the Lushai Hills, but to make no change in his status or allowance as a member of the Assam Commission."

The Government of Bengal on being consulted, agreed to the inclusion of Demagiri in the Lushai Hills (their letter No. 278-P.D.,* dated the 4th September 1897) and in their letter No. 667-P.D., dated the 9th October 1897 submitted to the Government of India a notification defining the boundary between Chittagong Hill Tracts and the Lushai Hills.

A Conference to discuss the numerous matters relative to the transfer took place on 12th August 1897 at Chittagong, among those present being Mr. H. J. S. Cotton, Chief Commissioner of Assam and Mr. Collier, Commissioner of Chittagong.

The proposals put forward by the Chief Commissioner in his letter of July 1897 were accepted by the Government of India

in their letter No. 155. E.B.† dated the 27th January 1898, from which the following are extracts.

“...2. The first step must, as you say, be the formal transfer of the South Lushai Hills from the Government of Bengal to the Administration of Assam. This will be effected by the issue of a Proclamation under section 3 of the Government of India Act, 1854 (17 and 18 Vict., 77). Neither the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal nor the Governor-General in Council sees any objection to your proposal to include Demagiri and the adjoining villages in the Lushai Hills. A copy of the Proclamation which it is intended to issue is enclosed, together with a draft Regulation to amend the Assam Frontier Tracts Regulation, 1880 (II of 1880), and revised drafts of six of the notifications received with your letter under reply.

* * * *

6. The rules embodied in the draft notification which formed Appendix VIII to your letter are accepted in substance.

* * * *

8. The proposal that the officer in charge of the amalgamated area should be styled “Superintendent of the Lushai Hills” is approved and accepted.”

On 1st April 1898 a proclamation by the Government of India No. 591-E.B.* placed the South Lushai Hills under the administration of Assam. It ran as follows—“591-E.B. Whereas the territories known as the South Lushai Hills, were by a Proclamation No. 1697-E., dated the 6th September 1895, issued under the Government of India Act, 1865 (28 and 29 Vict., Cap. 17) section 4, included within the lower Provinces of Bengal, and whereas the Tract known as Rutton Puiya’s villages, including Demagiri, in the Hill Tracts of Chittagong is also included within the said Lower Provinces, and whereas it is expedient that the said territories and tract should now be placed under the administration of the Chief Commissioner of Assam ; know all men, and it is hereby proclaimed, that the Governor-General in Council has been pleased, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Government of India Act, 1854 (17 and 18

† Assam Secretariat, For., A, May 1898, Nos. 13-46.

* Assam Secretariat, For., A, May 1898, Nos. 13-46.

Vict., Cap. 77) and with the sanction and approbation of the Secretary of the State for India, to take the said territories and tract under his immediate authority and management, and to place them under the administration of the Chief Commissioner of Assam, and further to direct that henceforth they shall be included within the Province of Assam."

Another Proclamation of the same date by the Assam Government, No. 977-P. ran as follows :—"977-P. With the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council the Chief Commissioner hereby declares that the Lushai Hills shall be placed in charge of an officer who will be styled "Superintendent of the Lushai Hills" and appoints Major John Shakespear C.I.E., D.S.O., to be the First Superintendent."

A third proclamation, No. 978-P., by the Chief Commissioner of Assam, published the rules for the administration of the Lushai Hills, rules which with periodical modifications have remained in force till today. One of the main principles of these rules is the internal control of the villages by their own leaders, the Chiefs. This was one of the most important aspects of Major Shakespear's policy and, as he states in the report for 1897-98, the last year in which the North Lushai Hills remained separate from the South, his aim was to interfere as little as possible between the Chiefs and their people and to do all he could to impress upon the Chiefs their responsibility for the maintenance of order in their villages. In a note which Shakespear recorded on 22nd March 1905, on leaving the district, he said, "I am sure that the sound policy is to do all we can to make the best of the form of Government we found existing. The people are quite ready to run to an officer whenever the chief's decision does not suit them, and as the decision in every case must be displeasing to the loser, there is a great tendency to appeal to the nearest Sahib, but this does not mean that the chief's rule is unpopular or that their decisions are always corrupt, and while admitting that in many cases the order passed may not be as just as we should like it to be, I am convinced that it is better to uphold the government of the chiefs and to govern through them, rather than to try to govern without them. With this view, I have submitted proposals for educating

the sons of the chiefs. I am strongly opposed to the formation of many petty hamlets. Every chief has his boundaries now and I should not subdivide the land further. Where a chief has sons, he may if he likes give them hamlets within his boundaries, but his responsibility for the collection of house-tax and the carrying out of orders should not thereby be diminished."

VII. The Lushai Hills District from 1898 onwards—
An important event of the year 1898-99 was the beginning of Shakespear's system of 'Land Settlement', the basis of which was to give to each Chief a certain area of country within which he and his people could move about as they liked. This scheme was successfully carried out and holds the field until the present day. It has been of the greatest benefit to the people themselves as well as to subsequent administrators.

A detail which should be recorded at this point is that in 1897-98, the last year of separate administration for the North and South, Shakespear discontinued in the North Lushai Hills the refund of ten per cent, for commission on account of revenue on the ground that it was never given in the Southern Hills and was quite an unnecessary concession. He says that the discontinuance had caused no grumbling.

In 1901-2 an important event was the introduction of the new system of 'Circle administration', a system which was adumbrated in the report for 1895-96, the last one which Shakespear recorded before he left the South Lushai District on transfer to the North. The whole district was divided into Circles : 12 in the Aijal Subdivision and 6 in the Lungleh Subdivision. An Interpreter was appointed in each as a Channel between the Subdivisional Officers and the Chiefs and their people. This system, of which Shakespear laid the foundation, has stood the test of 40 years experience and is still working well. Experience has shown, however, that it is necessary to maintain vigilance so that the Interpreters do not usurp the positions of the Chiefs.

In this year 23 Chiefs had the privilege of being taken down to Silchar by Colonel Shakespear to meet the Viceroy, Curzon, who was then on his way up to Manipur.

The Military Police were reduced in this year by 150 to a strength of 840 and were armed with Martini rifles.

There is nothing worth noting in the following three years, except that 1905 saw the departure of Colonel Shakespear from these hills for Manipur. He had served for 5 years as Superintendent of the South Lushai Hills, for a year as Political Officer of the North Lushai Hills, and for 8 years as Superintendent of the Lushai Hills: and had left his mark on administration of these areas.

In 1906-07 it is mentioned that there was a tendency for the Circle System, which had been reported to be working well in the intervening years, to be abused by the Interpreters for their own advantage. There was some trouble in the far south of the District where outrages were committed by the people of Zongling in what was then unadministered territory about 7 miles south of our southern border, but owing to the lateness of the season punitive operations had to be postponed until the next cold weather.

These operations took place in December 1907, Major Cole taking with him a force of 100 Military Police under Lieutenant-Colonel Loch. The fine of Rs. 500 which it had been decided to impose was realised without difficulty in the shape of 20 guns at Rs. 25 each. Our officers then met the Burma Officers at Lakhi, one day's march south of Zongling, and discussed with them proposals for the delimitation of the southern boundary of the Lushai Hills and for bringing under administration the tract between Northern Arakan and the Lushai Hills. The Burma Officers were Mr. W.L. Thom, Deputy Commissioner of the Arakan Hill Tracts District, and Mr. W. Street, Superintendent of the Chin Hills.

An interesting change was made in the Circle System by which Interpreters were made to reside at Aijal and only go to their Circles once in three months.

In 1910 the Aijal-Sairang Cart Road was completed.

The partial failure of crops in 1910-11 as an indirect result of the flowering of the bamboos, was followed by serious scarcity all over the district. The effect of this flowering was to cause a tremendous increase in number of the rats, who destroyed all crops. Government had to distribute relief, and the total amount finally given out was Rs. 5,85,000. Since it

was useless to hand out money to the people when there was no rice within the district to buy, this relief was given in the form of orders for rice at a fixed price on shopkeepers at Sairang for Aijal and Demagiri for Lungleh, to which places rice was imported from outside the district.

The Eastern Bengal and Assam Government decided to fix the boundary* of the district on the south of the Sherkor region and proposals to this end, as made by Colonel Loch and modified by Major Cole, the Superintendent of the Lushai Hills, were approved by Government in their letter No. 432-P.,* dated the 21st June 1911. Keokratong on the Chittagong Hill Tracts border was taken as the western starting point and the line ran fairly straight east across the Coladyne past Kaisi to the Sulla and then north-east past Laiki and keeping north of Zongling.

In 1914-15, the first of the war years, the Lushai Hills Military Police Battalion supplied 103 officers and men for the Army in October 1914. They also sent 101 officers and men to Manipur for eight months to relieve the regular unit there. Throughout the war the Battalion supplied to the Gurkha Brigade a total of 7 Indian Officers, 36 Non-Commissioned Officers and 1,024 men. Besides fighting troops a Labour Corps of 2,000 men was raised without any difficulty in 1917-18 and went to France under Lieutenant-Colonel Playfair. This Labour Corps earned a good name for itself when on service and returned in June 1918 when it was disbanded.

In September 1915, the then Superintendent, Mr. Hezlett, and his two Agricultural Inspectors together with a party of Chiefs, paid a visit to Kohima to acquire information on the methods of cultivating terraced rice, and as a consequence two Angamis were employed at Aijal and one at Lungleh to teach the Lushais their methods. This process has gone on with varying success ever since but it has had to face many difficulties not least of which is the apathy of the Lushais themselves.

In 1917-18 there was serious unrest in the unadministered

* Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Political, A, January 1912, Nos. 7-13.

area lying to the south between the district border and Arakan Hill Tracts, which manifested itself in the shape of raids within our border and elsewhere. The Superintendent Mr. H. A. C. Colquhoun, I.C.S., went there in January 1918 with an escort of rifles and visited the villages of Zonglong, Chapi and Laikei. There was no opposition and he exacted punishment in the shape of fines. Conditions in the district were also affected by the disturbances which took place in that year in the Chin Hills and in Manipur. The Military Police Battalion was called upon to send parties of troops to the Manipur Border as well as to Falam to help the Chin Hills administration and also to guard the Lungleh-Haka Road. In addition to this, 150 men from the 3rd Assam Rifles were sent to Haka itself in December 1917.

These disturbances in the south continued during 1918-19 and the unadministered villages showed considerable hostility during this period. The Battalion had to supply 287 officers and men for services in Manipur in connection with the Kuki operations. Altogether it was a bad year with disturbed conditions in the south, bad agricultural conditions and a serious outbreak of the post-war influenza in Aijal Subdivision.

By 1921-22 disturbances in the direction of the Chin Hills had subsided and the inhabitants of the Lushai Hills ceased to be nervous. In that year orders were received about the future of the unadministered territory in which the Lushai Hills, the Chin Hills, the 'Arakan Hill Tracts and the Chittagong Hill Tracts were interested and the boundaries were settled.

In 1923-24 the Governor, Sir John Kerr, visited Aijal, and passed orders which led to the eventual extinction of the long outstanding agricultural loans which were given out in the scarcity between 1910 and 1912. In a note which he recorded on the 19th December 1923, Sir John observed that he had gone into the matter at some length with Mr. S. N. Mackenzie the Superintendent and Mr. Tilbury, the Subdivisional Officer at Lungleh, and stated his conclusion thus, "I am convinced that our best course is to cut our losses and to bring the business to an end as soon as possible." The bulk of the outstandings being irrecoverable, the result was that in the following year they were practically wholly written off.

In the cold weather of 1924-25, Mr. N. E. Parry, I.C.S., the Superintendent, made a long tour in the hitherto unadministered area in the South of the district, where he met the Deputy Commissioner, Chin Hills. Mr. Parry's recommendations were mainly in the direction of bringing these areas under the same system of administration as the rest of the district, proposal with the Assam Government had no difficulty in agreeing.

In 1925-26 the bamboos were again reported to be flowering and the Superintendent, Mr. Parry instituted a rat-killing campaign, which resulted in over half a million of these animals being killed. This threat of renewed scarcity arising out of the flowering of bamboos persisted in the following year, but fortunately did not materialise to the extent which it did in 1910-12. In fact, as the Commissioner noted at the time, the usual period is 30 years and, therefore, it ought not to have been expected so early as this.

In 1931-32 the Zongling area, previously under loose political control, was with the sanction of the Secretary of State conveyed in Foreign and Political Department Government of India letter No. *F-185/X/28, dated the 17th January 1930, included in the district, certain adjoining areas being at the same time included in the Chin Hills District of Burma.

In 1935-36 was inaugurated the South Lushai Chiefs Conference. The idea had originated with Pu Makthanga, the Lushai Chief of Aijal. Three such Conferences were held in the cold weather of that year and promised success.

In 1936-37 there was recorded the first beginnings of the Lushai Cottage Industries, which were started by the enterprise of Major A. G. McCall, I.C.S., and his wife. The first class of work which they developed was that of making Lushai rugs, an indigenous industry which they greatly improved. The work has greatly enlarged since and there is a definite hope that it may become a permanent institution in this district.

In 1937-38 a certain amount of anxiety was caused to the authorities by a "revivalist" outbreak which contained dangerous possibilities. The matter became so serious that the Super-

* Assam Secretariat, Political, A December 1931, Nos. 27-59.

intendant had to go himself with an armed escort to one village, Kalkang, and compel the people to give up their hysterical doings. Such hysteria is a thing to which Lushais are always prone and it has to be carefully watched.

In this year Major McCall initiated an elaborate system of Welfare Committees in the villages with a view to serving two purposes—(1) the dissemination of public health information by authoritative means and (2) the formation of a local village consultative machinery capable of being adapted to any electoral needs which the future might bring, and with the intention also that such a system might strengthen the relationship between the Chiefs and their subjects.

VIII. The Constitution Act of 1935—Neither the Assam Government nor any other authorities who dealt with the matter had any difficulty in agreeing that the Lushai Hills should be excluded from the purview of the New Constitution, and they were accordingly classed as an "Excluded Area" in terms of the Government of India (Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas) Order 1936.

POLITICAL OFFICERS, NORTH LUSHAI HILLS

- 1890 Captain H. R. Browne, killed 6th September 1890.
 1890-1892 Mr. R. B. McCabe, I.C.S.
 1892-1894 Mr. A. W. Davis, I.C.S.
 1894-1897 Mr. A. Porteous, I.C.S.
 1897-1898 Major J. Shakespear, Col.E., D.S.O.

SUPERINTENDENTS, SOUTH LUSHAI HILLS

- 1891-1896 Captain (later Colonel) J. Shakespear.
 (Leinster Regiment).
 1896-1898 Mr. R. H. Sneyd Hutchinson, I.P.

SUPERINTENDENTS, THE LUSHAI HILLS DISTRICT

- 1898-1899 Major J. Shakespear.
 1899-1900 Captain H. W. G. Cole, I.A.
 1900-1903 Major J. Shakespear.
 1903-1904 Mr. L. O. Clarke, I.C.S.
 and Major J. Shakespear.
 1904-1905 Major J. Shakespear.
 1905-1906 Mr. J. C. Arbuthnott, I.C.S.
 Major Loch.
 Major H. W. G. Cole. } For short periods.
 1906-1911 Major H. W. G. Cole.
 1911-1912 Major W. Kennedy.
 1912-1913 Major Loch.
 Mr. F. C. Henniker, I.C.S.
 and
 Mr. J. Hezlett, I.C.S. } For short periods.
 1913-1917 Mr. J. Hezlett, I.C.S.
 1917-1919 Mr. H. A. C. Colquhoun, I.C.S.
 1919-1921 Mr. W. L. Scott, I.C.S.
 1921-1922 Mr. S. N. Mackenzie, I.C.S.
 1922-1923 Mr. W. L. Scott, I.C.S.

| | |
|-----------|-----------------------------|
| 1923-1924 | Mr. S. N. Mackenzie, I.C.S. |
| 1924-1928 | Mr. N. E. Parry, I.C.S. |
| 1928-1932 | Mr. C. G. G. Helme, I.C.S. |
| 1932-1942 | Major A. G. McCall I.C.S. |

SUBDIVISIONAL OFFICERS, LUNGLEH

| | |
|-----------|--|
| 1898-1899 | Mr. F. C. T. Halliday, Bengal Police. |
| 1899-1902 | Mr. C. B. Drake-Brockman, Bengal Police. |
| 1902-1904 | Mr. G. P. Whalley, I.P. |
| 1904-1906 | Mr. A. R. Giles. |
| 1906-1907 | Mr. W. T. Fellman. |
| 1907-1909 | Mr. C. N. Shadwell. |
| 1909-1910 | Lieutenant J. H. G. Buller. |
| 1910-1912 | Mr. R. W. Von Morde, Eastern Bengal and Assam Provincial Service. |
| 1912-1914 | Mr. M. Bradshaw, I.P. |
| 1915-1918 | Mr. J. Needham, I.P. |
| 1918-1919 | Mr. H. G. Bartley, I.P. |
| 1919-1924 | Mr. J. Needham, I.P. |
| 1924-1926 | Mr. H. Fischer, Assistant Superintendent of Police. |
| 1927-1932 | Mr. W. Tilbury, M.G., Extra Assistant Commissioner, Died on 15th December 1932. |
| 1933-1937 | Mr. L. E. Peters, Extra Assistant Commissioner. |
| 1937-1938 | Mr. G. P. Jarman, Extra Assistant Commissioner. |
| 1938-1942 | Mr. L. E. Peters, Extra Assistant Commissioner. |

COMMANDANTS, SURMA VALLEY MILITARY POLICE BATTALION

| | |
|-----------|--------------------------------|
| 1890-1890 | Mr. W. W. Daly, Bengal Police. |
| 1890-1891 | Lieutenant Cole. |
| 1891-1892 | Captain G. H. Loch. |
| 1892-1893 | Captain G. H. Loch. |

COMMANDANTS, NORTH LUSHAI MILITARY POLICE BATTALION

| | | | | |
|---|-----|-----|-----|------------------|
| 1894-1895 | ... | ... | ... | Captain H. Loch. |
| (In 1894-95 the North Lushai Battalion was separated from Silchar Battalion) | | | | |
| 1895-1898 | --- | --- | --- | Captain H. Loch. |

COMMANDANTS, SOUTH LUSHAI HILLS MILITARY POLICE (IF SUCH WAS ITS TITLE)

| | | | | |
|---------|-----|-----|-----|--|
| 1892-95 | ... | ... | --- | Mr. C. W. C. Plowden, I.P. |
| 1895-96 | ... | ... | --- | Captain J. Shakespear (as well as Superinten- dent). |
| 1896-98 | --- | --- | --- | Mr. R. H. S. Hutchinson, I.P. |

COMMANDANTS OF THE LUSHAI HILLS MILITARY POLICE

| | |
|-----------|---|
| 1898-1914 | Major G. H. Loch. |
| 1914 | Captain H. C. Nicolay 2nd Gurkhas. |
| 1914-15 | Major Nicolay Captain F. K. Hensley the Guides. |
| 1915-16 | Captain F. K. Hensley Captain J. S. Ring |
| 1916-17 | Captain J. S. Ring Captain F. K. Hensley |
| 1917-18 | Captain F. K. Hensley Captain H. Falkland |
| 1918-19 | Captain H. Falkland |
| 1919-20 | Captain H. Falkland Captain Davies |
| 1920-21 | Captain H. Falkland Captain W. A. Gardiner |

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